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JUSTICE REINVESTMENT IN
ALASKA: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND
FUTURE OF SB 91
Michael A. Rosengart*
ABSTRACT
In the summer of 2016, Alaska Governor Bill Walker signed SB 91, a landmark
criminal justice reform law that implements a “justice reinvestment” program.
SB 91 aims to reduce Alaska’s prison population, cut corrections costs, and
then reinvest savings back into the state to improve public safety and reduce
recidivism. It is 193 sections long and is likely the most substantial change to
Alaskan criminal law since statehood. It also comes at a time when similar
legislation, spearheaded by the Justice Reinvestment Initiative, is proliferating
through the country. This Note overviews Alaska’s corrections problems that
prompted SB 91, discusses the law’s legislative history, highlights some of the
most important changes the law makes, and introduces some of the issues that
it may present going forward.

EDITOR’S NOTE
This Note was being finalized for publication between November 5 and
November 17, 2017. On November 7, the Alaska House of
Representatives passed an amended version of SB 54, which had
originated in the Senate in the spring and made changes to SB 91, by a
thirty-two to eight vote. On November 10, the Senate voted to concur
with the amended House version. SB 54 passed despite concerns about
the constitutionality of a change the House had made to class C felony
sentencing. Because of the limited opportunity to review the House
version of SB 54 before publication, those amendments are not
considered in this Note. All references to “SB 54,” therefore, are to the
version passed by the Senate in April 2017, which did not include the
constitutionally suspect provision.
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INTRODUCTION
Between 2007 and 2016, thirty-three states attempted criminal justice
reform through “justice reinvestment.”1 Justice reinvestment is about
using data and evidence-based practices to strategically remove
individuals from the corrections system, or reduce their exposure to the
corrections system, and then using the resulting money saved to enhance
public safety. Although this idea is straightforward, the details of who
spends less time in prison, by what means, and then how the savings get
reinvested are not.
In Alaska, the game in town is Senate Bill 91, more commonly known
as “SB 91.”2 At its core, SB 91 implements justice reinvestment by
imposing less punishment on offenders who do less harm to the
community and are less likely to reoffend, and reinvesting savings from
averted prison growth into practices and strategies shown to reduce
recidivism. Signed into law in the summer of 2016, SB 91 is likely the
largest revision of Alaska’s criminal justice system since statehood.3 It
implements twenty-one policy recommendations made by the Alaska
Criminal Justice Commission (ACJC).4 The ACJC—chaired by Gregory P.
Razo, a director of the Alaska Native Justice Center—is a group of
stakeholders from across the criminal justice system, including judges,
legislators, law enforcement officials, attorneys, and advocates, tasked by
the legislature with evaluating the state’s criminal justice system and
making recommendations for reform to the legislature.5
In April 2015, the ACJC engaged the Justice Reinvestment Initiative
(JRI) to assist in researching the causes and consequences of Alaska’s
growing prison population problem,6 which had grown at a rate of 27%
from 2005 to 2015.7 The JRI is a partnership between the U.S. Department
of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Assistance and The Pew Charitable Trusts
that was formed in 2010 to assist states with developing “cost-effective
1. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, 33 STATES REFORM CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICIES
THROUGH JUSTICE REINVESTMENT 1 (2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/
assets/2016/12/33_states_reform_criminal_justice_policies_through_justice_rei
nvestment.pdf.
2. S.B. 91, 29th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Alaska 2016).
3. James Brooks, Legislature Sends Crime Bill to Walker, JUNEAU EMPIRE (May
15, 2016), http://juneauempire.com/state/2016-05-15/legislature-sends-crimebill-walker.
4. Criminal Justice Reform, ALASKA SENATE MAJORITY, https://www.
alaskasenate.org/2016/criminal-justice-reform/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2017).
5. See S.B. 64, 28th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 32 (Alaska 2014).
6. ALASKA CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM’N, JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT 4 (2015)
[hereinafter JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT] http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/sites/
default/files/imported/acjc/AJRI/ak_jri_report_final12-15.pdf.
7. Id. at 1; see also discussion infra Section I.B.
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and evidence-based strategies” for decarceration.8 Based on findings the
JRI helped establish, the ACJC released its Justice Reinvestment Report in
December 2015.9 The Justice Reinvestment Report makes twenty-one
recommendations that fall into four categories: (i) adjustments to pretrial
practices through reforms grounded in empirical data;10 (ii) shifts to the
criminal code’s sentencing structure so that prison capacity is
concentrated on serious and violent offenders, rather than low-level
nonviolent offenders;11 (iii) improvements to re-entry, parole, and
probation practice;12 and (iv) additional oversight and accountability to
the criminal justice system.13 SB 91 implements these recommendations.
Within months of SB 91’s passage, the ACJC and the legislature
became aware of problems with the new law.14 In response to input from
the public and law enforcement, the ACJC offered fourteen new
recommendations in January 2017, mostly revising SB 91 provisions.15
Senator John Coghill, SB 91’s main sponsor, introduced SB 54 the
following month,16 and it passed the Senate by a nineteen-to-one vote on
April 7, 2017.17 Uproar grew in September 2017, though, after the
Department of Public Safety released its annual crime report for 2016,
showing significant increases in crime almost across the board.18 In
response, Governor Bill Walker announced that action on SB 54 would

8. NANCY LAVIGNE ET AL., JUSTICE REINVESTMENT INITIATIVE STATE
ASSESSMENT REPORT v (2014), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/
publication/22211/412994-Justice-Reinvestment-Initiative-State-AssessmentReport.PDF; see also infra notes 74–77 and accompanying text (describing JRI
further).
9. JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 4.
10. Id. at 15.
11. Id. at 18.
12. Id. at 22.
13. Id. at 27.
14. Zaz Hollander, Alaska’s Sweeping New Crime Law Already Under Pressure
For Change, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Jan. 25, 2017) https://www.adn.com/alaska
-news/crime-courts/2017/01/25/alaskas-sweeping-new-crime-law-alreadyunder-pressure-for-change/.
15. See generally ALASKA CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM’N, RECOMMENDATIONS TO
THE ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE BY THE ALASKA CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMISSION
(2017) [hereinafter RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE LEGISLATURE], www.ajc.state.ak.us/
sites/default/files/commissionrecommendations/acjcrecommendations1-14201
7 _10.pdf (providing fourteen new recommendations, including revisions to SB
91).
16. ALASKA S. JOURNAL, 30th Leg., 1st Sess. 216 (Feb. 10, 2017).
17. ALASKA S. JOURNAL, 30th Leg., 1st Sess. 838 (Apr. 7, 2017).
18. Tim Bradner, SB 91 Back in Legislative Crosshairs, MAT-SU VALLEY
FRONTIERSMAN (Sept. 16, 2017), http://www.frontiersman.com/news/sb-back-in
-legislative-crosshairs/article_493aa590-9b44-11e7-acfd-9f6cb4346065.html.
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therefore be a priority in the late October 2017 special legislative session.19
SB 54, if passed, would make three noteworthy changes, which are
discussed herein.
This Note contextualizes SB 91 both within Alaska and in the broader
field of contemporary criminal justice reform to provide a starting point
for discussion and evaluation of the law’s reforms. Part I summarizes
Alaska’s criminal justice landscape, particularly the history of the state’s
criminal justice laws, the legislative history of SB 91, and the work of the
ACJC. Part II illustrates how the ACJC’s recommendations were
translated into legislation. Part III highlights some potential concerns
about SB 91 based on justice reinvestment efforts in other states, academic
discussion of criminal justice reform, and the political realities in Alaska.
However, this Note is neither an exhaustive nor authoritative summary
of SB 91. Many of the law’s 193 sections are not referenced, and some
provisions that are discussed may have unmentioned exceptions. Instead,
this Note intends to provide a foundation to prompt further discussion
amongst stakeholders.
Ultimately, it is too soon to say with certainty how the relatively new
idea of “justice reinvestment” will shape Alaska’s criminal justice system
in the long term. Moreover, SB 91 is an aggressive endeavor compared to
justice reinvestment legislation in other states, making comparison
difficult. Nevertheless, there are good questions to be asked about
whether justice reinvestment is the “right way” to resolve the American
and Alaskan mass incarceration problems, and if justice reinvestment is
even capable of combatting mass incarceration at all. Put another way, do
reforms, like those in SB 91, meaningfully reduce crime, or do they just
cap prison populations with any improvement in crime rates merely
incidental? Relatedly, SB 91 makes several key tradeoffs. Evaluating the
law will therefore be crucial, and so are determinations of how to make
those evaluations. Given the nature of the legislative process and the
legislature’s stated goals, “success” will presumably be based on data: the
state’s prison population, corrections budget, and the returns on
reinvestment. But some argue that a data-driven framework misses the
mark and suggest alternatively that criminal justice reform should be
evaluated on the basis of fair justice, community safety, and pathways
away from crime. This Note seeks to start these important discussions.

19. Id.
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I. THE PAST: THE ROAD TO SB 91
A.

Alaska’s Pre-SB 91 Sentencing Law

Alaska’s bloated prison population traces its roots back to the 1990s
and early 2000s when the state, like the rest of the country, adopted a
“tough on crime” posture.20 As Senator John Coghill, who shepherded SB
91 through the legislature, later reflected, reacting to crime by expanding
the reach of criminal offenses and the severity of sentences was “easy.”21
At that time, as Coghill put it, nobody ever “paused to ask whether what
we were doing would actually reduce crime—it was just assumed that it
would.”22 Indeed, the legislature increased the scope and severity of
felony liability more than eighty times between 2000 and 2013, while
reducing it just once.23
Two additional practices likely also spurred growth in Alaska’s
prison population without even intending to be “tough on crime.” First,
although the state’s bail statute24 created a presumption of personalrecognizance release,25 courts overused third-party custodian release26 in
practice,27 making it harder for defendants to await trial outside of prison.
This arguably needless pre-trial incarceration can lead to higher
conviction rates, longer sentences, litigation disadvantages for
20. See Marc Mauer, Why Are Tough on Crime Policies So Popular?, 11 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 9, 10–11 (1999) (detailing trend of “tough on crime”); see also MICHAEL
TONRY, SENTENCING FRAGMENTS: PENAL REFORM IN AMERICA, 1975–2025 3–4 (2016)
(same).
21. Sen. John Coghill, Alaska Criminal Justice Reform Bill Has Been Unfairly
Attacked, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (June 25, 2016), https://www.adn.com/
commentary/article/alaska-criminal-justice-reform-bill-has-been-unfairlyattacked/2016/05/12/.
22. Id.
23. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, ALASKA FELONY SENTENCING PATTERNS: 2012 –
2013 17 (2016) [hereinafter ALASKA FELONY SENTENCING PATTERNS], http://www.
ajc.state.ak.us/sites/default/files/reports/research/final_draft_alaska_sentenci
ng_patterns_2012_-_2013.pdf.
24. ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020(a) (2008).
25. Personal-recognizance release is the “release of a defendant in a criminal
case in which the court takes the defendant’s word that he or she will appear for
a scheduled matter or when told to appear.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1463 (10th
ed. 2014). A defendant released on his personal recognizance does not have to
post bail. See id.
26. A third-party custodian is an individual or organization, approved by a
judicial officer, who is available to supervise a released defendant twenty-four
hours a day and is expected to report the defendant should he or she violate
conditions of their release. Elizabeth Johnston, Note, Sentenced by Tradition: The
Third-Party Custodian Condition of Pretrial Release in Alaska, 26 ALASKA L. REV. 317,
317 (2009).
27. See id. at 329 (referencing legislative history expressing concern at overuse
of third-party custodian requirement).
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defendants, and greater expense for the corrections system.28 Defendants
with greater pre-trial exposure to prison may also be more likely to
recidivate and engage in new criminal activity.29
Second, the state’s response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Blakely v. Washington, which held that factual bases for departures from a
statutory sentence must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt
in order to be constitutional,30 has led to longer prison sentences. Before
2005, Alaska, like many states, employed a system of presumptive
sentencing with single-year terms.31 To illustrate, a defendant convicted
of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor pre-Blakely would have been
sentenced to a presumptive prison term of eight years.32 If aggravating or
mitigating factors were proven to the sentencing judge by clear and
convincing evidence, the defendant could receive a higher or lower
sentence, respectively.33
The Alaska Court of Appeals soon confirmed that Blakely’s holding
had rendered Alaska’s pre-2005 sentencing structure unconstitutional.34
The legislature responded by enacting two key changes through SB 56.35
First, under the revised system, all determinations of aggravators were
put to the jury.36 More significantly, SB 56 converted presumptive terms
to presumptive ranges.37 Despite a stated legislative intent not to “bring
about an overall increase in the amount of active imprisonment for felony
sentences,”38 SB 56’s new presumptive ranges consistently put the former
presumptive term at the floor of the new presumptive ranges. In other
words, whereas the aforementioned conviction of first-degree sexual
abuse of a minor would carry a presumptive sentence of eight years in

28. See id. at 319–20 (arguing that third-party custodian release has been
ineffective and counterproductive).
29. CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP ET AL., THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PRETRIAL
DETENTION 4 (2013), http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/
2014/02/LJAF_Report_hidden-costs_FNL.pdf.
30. 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004).
31. See Stephanos Bibas & Susan Klein, The Sixth Amendment and Criminal
Sentencing, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 797 tbl.I (2008) (listing twenty-one states,
including Alaska, affected by Blakely).
32. State v. Moreno, 151 P.3d 480, 480–81 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).
33. Id.
34. Moreno, 151 P.3d at 481 (“It is true that Alaska’s pre–2005 presumptive
sentencing law violated the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial recognized in
Blakely because, under that law, aggravating factors (i.e., factors authorizing the
superior court to impose a higher maximum sentence) were litigated to the
sentencing judge under a ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard, rather than to
a jury under a ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard.”).
35. 2005 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 2.
36. Id. § 21.
37. Id. §§ 8–10, 12.
38. Id. § 1.
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prison before Blakely, the sentence would be eight to twelve years
following Blakely.39 Thus, an eight-year sentence went from being a
standard sentence to what might be considered a lenient one. This
tendency was typical for many felony-sentencing statutes,40 and
correlated with an increase in the average length of prison stays across all
categories of felonies between 2005 and 2014.41
B.

Alaska’s Problem of More Prisoners with Longer Sentences

Crime and prison data leading up to SB 91 generally painted a bleak
picture of criminal justice outcomes in Alaska in the 2000s. Although the
overall crime rate in Alaska has declined since the mid-1980s, it has been
increasing since 2010.42 Property crime has likewise been on a downward
trend since 1985, but also has been rebounding upward since 2011.43 The
state’s violent crime rate has trended upward since 1985, and increased
considerably between 2014 and 2015.44 Between 2004 and 2015, Alaska’s
violent crime rate increased by 15%, and the state went from having the
country’s seventh-worst violent crime rate to its second-worst, behind
only the District of Columbia.45

39. See id. § 12 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(i)(1)(A) from presumptive
term of eight years to presumptive range of eight to twelve years).
40. ALASKA FELONY SENTENCING PATTERNS, supra note 23, at 16; see also id. at
12 tbl.1 (demonstrating 2005 sentencing changes in tabular form).
41. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, ALASKA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORMS 6, fig.4
(2016), www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2016/12/alaskas_criminal_justice_
reforms.pdf; see also ALASKA S. FIN. COMM. MINUTES, 29th Leg. (Mar. 30, 2016)
(statement of Jordan Schilling, Staff, Sen. John Coghill at 2:07:06 PM) (indicating
sentence length increases across felony classes).
42. KHRISTY PARKER, ALASKA JUSTICE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS CTR., VIOLENT
CRIME REPORTED IN ALASKA, 1985–2015 1 fig.1 (2017) (showing downward trend in
overall crime rate, incidences of crime per 100,000 people, since 1985, but a
gradual increase since 2010); see also Nathaniel Herz, Governor Wants Alaska
Legislature to Toughen Criminal Justice in Special Session, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS
(Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.adn.com/alaska-news/crime-courts/2017
/09/15/governor-wants-alaska-legislature-to-toughen-criminal-justice-duringspecial-session/ (providing graphic showing increased incidences of crime in
seven categories of offenses since 2012).
43. KHRISTY PARKER, ALASKA JUSTICE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS CTR., PROPERTY
CRIME REPORTED IN ALASKA, 1985–2015 1 fig.1 (2017) (showing downward trend in
property crime rate, incidences of crime per 100,000 people, since 1985, but a
gradual increase since 2011).
44. Id. (showing per 100,000 people, in 2014 about 600 violent crimes
occurred, but by 2015, there was an increase to around 700 violent crimes).
45. Compare FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2004:
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 86 tbl.5 (2004), https://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_04/
documents/CIUS_2004_Section2.pdf, with FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME
IN THE UNITED STATES 2015: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS tbl.5 (2015), https://ucr.fbi.
gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-in-the-u.s.-2015/tables/table-5.
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The state’s prison population has also been growing. In 2005, there
were 3903 individuals in Alaskan prisons.46 By 2015, there were 5095
individuals in Alaska prisons—an increase of 27%.47 This growth, SB 91
advocates often noted, was three times faster than Alaska’s population
growth.48 In reports produced for the ACJC, Pew projected an additional
11% increase in the state’s prison population by 2018, which would make
Alaska’s prison population one of the fastest growing in the country.49
The ACJC identified three main drivers for the increase in the state’s
prison population. One was that while prison stays were getting longer—
the average length of stay for Alaskan prisoners had risen for all
categories of felony offenses since 2005—recidivism rates were not
declining.50 Two-thirds of released Alaskan offenders returned to prison
within three years,51 which was among the highest rates in the country.52
Thus, longer sentences were failing to deter released offenders from
committing new crimes.53
A second driver was the increase in the State’s pretrial prison
population.54 While Alaska’s post-conviction prison population grew 14%
between 2005 and 2014, the pretrial prison population, which makes up
over a quarter of the total prison population, grew by a staggering 81%.55
That means the State is housing and spending money on far more
individuals who have not yet been convicted of a crime.
Lastly, the ACJC highlighted the fact that three-quarters of the state’s
prison population were nonviolent offenders, and furthermore, over half
of those nonviolent offenders were misdemeanants.56 Thus, not only were
Alaskan prisons filling with individuals who might more appropriately

46.
47.
48.
49.

JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 4 fig.1.
Id. at 1, 4 fig.1.
Id. at 1.
PUB. SAFETY PERFORMANCE PROJECT, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, STATES
PROJECT 3% INCREASE IN PRISONERS BY 2018 (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.pew
trusts.org/en/multimedia/data-visualizations/2014/states-project-3-percentincrease-in-prisoners-by-2018.
50. JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 9–10.
51. Id. at 1.
52. See PEW CTR. ON STATES, STATE OF RECIDIVISM: THE REVOLVING DOOR OF
AMERICA’S PRISONS 10–11 exhibit.1 (2011) (listing highest rate of recidivism at
61.2%). This Pew study put Alaska’s recidivism rate at 50.4%, which was still the
sixth highest. Id. The two-thirds figure comes from a 2007 study by the Alaska
Judicial Council. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, CRIMINAL RECIDIVISM IN ALASKA 1
(2007), www.ajc.state.ak.us/reports/1-07CriminalRecidivism.pdf.
53. JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 9.
54. See generally id. at 6–8 (noting findings on pretrial detention).
55. Id. at 6.
56. Id. at 2, 9 fig.3.
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be out of prison because of the status of their case, many of those, and
others, might not even be right for incarceration given the nature of their
offense.
All of this, unsurprisingly, had a dramatic impact on corrections
spending. In 2005, the State spent $184 million on corrections.57 By 2014,
that figure had ballooned 75% to $327 million.58 As of 2016, close to 3% of
Alaska’s total expenditures went to corrections, which was above the
national median.59 The Department of Corrections reported that it was
operating at 101% capacity in 2015, despite having recently opened a new
prison, Goose Creek Correction Center, which had cost $250 million to
construct.60 With the excess capacity and the projected additional growth
in prison population, the status quo was unsustainable.61
C.

How the Perspective Changed in Alaska

Considering both of these trends—the uptick in violent crime and
the growth in the prison population, as well as budgetary concerns—the
interesting question is which one catalyzed SB 91. It was a contentious
topic of discussion in the legislature, as evidenced by one exchange in the
House Finance Committee between Representative Lance Pruitt and
Senator Coghill, who was offering testimony:
PRUITT: I’ve heard it said by yourself, I’ve heard it said by
others, but I guess I just want to make sure we explicitly make it
clear what the intent of the bill is—the policy goal behind the
bill. It seems like from your conversations, from others, that the
intent and the genesis of this bill solely rests on the fact that we
are trying to save money going forward in the state. Is that an
appropriate way to kind of cache what the genesis and the intent
of this bill is?
COGHILL: No.
[Pause]

57. Id. at 3.
58. Id.
59. NATIONAL ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT:
EXAMINING FISCAL 2014–2016 STATE SPENDING 57 tbl.33 (2016), http://www.nasbo.
org/mainsite/reports-data/state-expenditure-report.
60. JEFF JESSEE ET AL., 2015 RECIDIVISM REDUCTION PLAN 1 (2015), www.correct.
state.ak.us/commish/docs/hb266.pdf.
61. See, e.g., Alaska H. Fin. Comm. Audio Tapes, 29th Leg. (Apr. 20, 2016)
(statement of Sen. John Coghill at 9:22:55 AM) (“[W]e don’t have the money to
keep doing it the way we’re doing it.”).

34.2 NOTE - ROSENGART (DO NOT DELETE)

246

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

11/26/2017 7:01 PM

Vol. 34:2

PRUITT: Ok. Then can we expand on that?
COGHILL: You wanted a simple answer, and that is the simple
answer. This is about public safety, but better outcomes for the
dollars we spend. So dollars are involved, there’s no doubt about
that. . . . But it’s explicit in the [Alaska Criminal Justice]
Commission’s instructions and I can tell you without any
ashame [sic] at all . . . [that] this is about how we can do it better.
This is about public safety, this is about how do we hold people
accountable . . . . So the question all along the way is how do we
make it work better. Some people say it’s broken and that this is
not providing the outcomes that we want. I knew that before we
started going into the downturn of the economy. I started
working on this six years ago. . . . It’s not a new topic. It’s just
that we’ve categorized it in a way now that says, ‘we can’t afford
new prisons. How do we get better outcomes? Is the public
going to be safer?’ And so it’s all wrapped up into it. But it really
is about how do we keep the public safe, how do we reduce the
crime rate. If people come in with behavior and health issues,
how do we deal with it? And right now we’re not dealing with
that. . . . So it really is about public safety and not cost savings.
However, we don’t have the money to keep doing it the way
we’re doing it.62
Indeed, SB 91 is about public safety. But, as Senator Coghill
acknowledged, the bill was also framed largely around fiscal savings.
Discussion of SB 91’s budgetary impact is pervasive in the bill’s legislative
history. This is unsurprising though, as the State’s overall budget issues
overshadowed just about everything the legislature was doing at the time.
In 2015, the State was operating a deficit of between three and four billion
dollars, in a depressed oil market to boot.63 The Department of Law64 and
the Department of Corrections65 were both greatly affected by budget
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Alana Samuels, The Stingiest State in the Union, THE ATLANTIC
(Aug. 31, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/08/
alaska-budget-crisis/402775/.
64. See Matt Buxton, Attorney General: Blaming Reform for Rise in Crime is Too
Simple, FAIRBANKS DAILY NEWS-MINER (Feb. 2, 2017), http:// www.newsminer.
com/news/alaska_news/attorney-general-blaming-justice-reform-bill-for-risein-crime/article_3cf97d92-e92e-11e6-84df-9f841eb6f563.html
(discussing Attorney General Jahna Lindemuth’s legislative testimony describing
Department of Law budget cuts and decreased capacity to prosecute).
65. See Will Earnhart, Local Communities Often Pay the Price for State Budget
Cuts, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.adn.com/ opinions/
2017/02/08/local-communities-often-pay-the-price-for-state-budget-cuts/
(noting the Department of Correction’s 35% budget cut for jails).
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cuts. Furthermore, had the state not changed its corrections practices, it
would have had more inmates than beds almost immediately and would
have had to open another new prison at an estimated cost of $169
million.66
Moreover, discussion of SB 91’s budgetary impact is pervasive in the
bill’s legislative history, and there is ample direct evidence to suggest that
the budget substantially motivated legislators. SB 64, which had created
the ACJC and so kick-started the process culminating in SB 91, set the tone
with its sponsor statement, indicating that the bill “implements provenpractices [sic] to reduce recidivism and cut the costs of corrections while
maintaining public safety.”67 SB 91’s sponsor statement likewise stated
that the bill aimed in part to “control corrections spending.”68
But the most indicative document may be the letter sent by the
President of the Senate, Kevin Meyer, and the Speaker of the House, Mike
Chenault, to the ACJC in September 2015. The letter instructed the ACJC
to develop policy options that would avert future prison growth and
reduce the prison population by between 15% and 25%.69 The two
legislators’ stated reason for criminal justice reform was “the State’s fiscal
situation and . . . revenue shortfall,” which was creating “pressure to
examine all areas and programs of the state.”70 They added that “[t]he
work that you are doing will be important as the legislature proceeds with
budgetary changes in the areas of criminal justice and the Department of
Corrections,” and therefore asked the ACJC to “deliver policy options
that . . . not only avoid future spending, but also achieve savings.”71 The
letter’s requests guided the ACJC’s study of the issues in Alaska’s
criminal justice system.72

66. JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT supra note 6, at 1.
67. JOHN COGHILL & LESIL MCGUIRE, SPONSOR STATEMENT: OMNIBUS
CRIME/CORRECTIONS/RECIDIVISM BILL VERSION M (2014) (emphasis added),
http://www.akleg.gov/basis/get_documents.asp?session=28&docid=23445.
68. JOHN COGHILL, SENATE BILL 91 SPONSOR STATEMENT: OMNIBUS CRIMINAL
LAW & PROCEDURE; CORRECTIONS VERSION N (2016), http://www.akleg.gov/
basis/get_documents.asp?session=29&docid=63794.
69. Letter from Mike Chenault, Speaker of the House, Alaska State
Legislature, and Kevin Meyer, Senate President, Alaska State Legislature, to
Alaska Criminal Justice Comm’n (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.akleg.gov/
basis/get_documents.asp?session=29&docid=66393.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. ALASKA CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE ALASKA STATE
LEGISLATURE 3 (2016), http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/sites/default/files/imported/
acjc/acjc_annual_report_2016.pdf.
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The broader landscape surrounding justice reinvestment—including
not only the recent embrace of criminal justice reform from fiscal
conservatives,73 but also the growing national involvement in the Justice
Reinvestment Initiative (JRI)—also suggests a budgetary motivation for
criminal justice reform in Alaska. The JRI assists states with “cost-effective
and evidence-based strategies” for decarceration.74 As of 2016, thirtythree states had engaged in the JRI process, meaning that Pew assisted
those states’ governments in establishing bipartisan groups of
policymakers, stakeholders, and professionals; worked with them to
gather and analyze criminal justice data in their states; and then assisted
them in producing recommendations for reform that legislatures could
implement.75 JRI policy packages often look very similar,76 and the JRI
notes that the “impetus” for joining JRI frequently includes rising
corrections costs, “growing dissatisfaction with current returns on public
safety investment,” and growing state budget crises and shortfalls.77
Alaska requested JRI assistance in 2015.78
Finally, the way in which SB 91 was presented to the public confirms
that budget-cutting helped move the bill. Op-eds from state officials often
noted that SB 91 would save upwards of $200 million dollars79 and that
rising costs, if not combatted, could soon begin jeopardizing public
safety.80 As two academic observers put it shortly before SB 91 was
introduced: “The current fiscal crisis presents Alaska with both challenge
and opportunity. The challenge is how to bring criminal justice

73. See generally, e.g., John G. Malcolm, Criminal Justice Reform at the
Crossroads, 20 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 249, 254–57 (2016) (illustrating trend of
conservative-controlled legislatures engaging with criminal justice reform to
combat rising prison costs).
74. NANCY LAVIGNE ET AL., supra note 8, at v (emphasis added), http://www.
urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/22211/412994-Justice-ReinvestmentInitiative-State-Assessment-Report.PDF.
75. Samantha Harvell et al., Reforming Sentencing and Corrections Policy: The
Experience of Justice Reinvestment Initiative States at Executive Summary, 29 FED.
SENT’G REP. 175, 175 (2016–2017).
76. See generally id. at 176–77 (describing typical features of JRI legislation).
See also Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections, 91
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 537, 564 (2015) (discussing similar features).
77. LAVIGNE ET AL., supra note 8, at 7–8.
78. JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 1.
79. E.g., Bill Walker, Alaska Crime Bill is a Big Step Forward But Needs an
Adjustment, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (July 11, 2016), https://www.adn.com/
opinions/2016/07/11/walker-crime-bill-is-a-big-step-forward-but-needs-anadjustment/ (“The reforms are estimated to save a total of $380 million ($211
million in direct net savings; $169 [million] in savings from averted growth).”).
80. Jahna Lindemuth, Opinion, Criminal Justice Reform Bill is Right for Alaska,
ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.adn.com/opinions/2016/
12/07/criminal-justice-reform-bill-is-right-for-alaska/.
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expenditures in line with fiscal realities. The opportunity presented to
Alaska is to use an evidence-based process to inform difficult decisions
that lie ahead.”81
D.

SB 91’s Legislative History

In 2014, the legislature indicated in its operating budget that it
desired various government departments to study how they could
combat Alaska’s nearly 66% recidivism rate, which had been identified in
a report produced by the Alaska Judicial Council in 2007.82 SB 64, passed
in 2014, among other preliminary reforms, established the ACJC.83 The
ACJC engaged the JRI in April of 2015 to assist in researching the scope,
causes, and consequences of Alaska’s growing prison population, and
released its “Justice Reinvestment Report” shortly before the new year.84
After discussing key findings—namely that pretrial defendants and
nonviolent offenders were major drivers of the increased prison
population,85 that sentences were getting longer without getting more
effective in terms of reducing recidivism,86 and that alternatives to
incarceration were being under- or inefficiently utilized87—the Report
offered twenty-one recommendations that the ACJC projected could
reduce the state’s prison population by 21% by 2024 and save $424 million
over a decade.88 Its recommendations centered around changes, all based
on data-proven practice, to pretrial procedure, sentencing, and
supervision and re-entry.89
Senator Coghill introduced SB 91 in February of 2016.90 Over the next
two months, the bill wound its way through the Senate’s State Affairs,
Judiciary, and Finance Committees, before being brought to the House
Judiciary and Finance Committees in April.91 Ultimately, the bill was

81. Brad A. Myrstol & Barbara Armstrong, Criminal Justice Reform and
Recidivism Reduction, 32(4) ALASKA JUST. F. 1, 12 (Winter 2016), https://
scholarworks.alaska.edu/bitstream/handle/11122/6461/ajf.324.winter2016.pdf
?sequence=4.
82. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, CRIMINAL RECIDIVISM IN ALASKA 1 (2007),
www.ajc.state.ak.us/reports/1-07CriminalRecidivism.pdf.
83. 2014 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 83.
84. JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 1.
85. Id. at 6–7.
86. Id. at 9–10.
87. Id. at 11–14.
88. Id. at 14.
89. See id. (listing effects of recommendations).
90. ALASKA S. JOURNAL, 29th Leg., 2d Sess. 1759 (Feb. 3, 2016).
91. See generally, ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE, BILL HISTORY/ACTION FOR
LEGISLATURE: SB 91, http://www.akleg.gov/basis/Bill/detail/29?Root=SB91#
tab6_4 (listing legislative actions on SB 91) (last visited Sept. 10, 2017).
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supported by a wide spectrum of interest groups, including the ACLU of
Alaska, the Alaska Federation of Natives, several outside conservative
groups, several victims’ groups, and several members of the Department
of Corrections.92 Even former U.S. House Speaker Newt Gingrich, a
Republican from Georgia, wrote to the legislature in support of SB 91.93
On the other hand, SB 91 was opposed by many representatives of law
enforcement and other victims’ advocates.94
The bill passed the House by a twenty-eight to ten margin on May
11, 2016,95 and the Senate two days later by a fourteen to five vote.96 Only
one Democrat—Representative Andy Josephson from Anchorage, who
had formerly been a prosecutor in Kotzebue97—voted no. All but one of
the nay voters were from the Anchorage metropolitan area.

II. THE PRESENT: SB 91 AS THE FOUNDATION OF ALASKA’S
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM
The ACJC’s report offered twenty-one recommendations
unanimously supported by its thirteen commissioners.98 Each
recommendation identifies a particular problem, and provides guidance
on “specific action” that the legislature should implement. The first
twenty recommendations relate to pretrial, sentencing, and community
supervision practice, as well as general oversight and accountability.99
The twenty-first recommendation offers general suggestions to “advance
crime victim priorities,” such as improving the courts’ and law
enforcement’s communication with victims.100 All of the ACJC’s
recommendations were guided by key findings, based on review of the
data in Alaska as well as general criminology research (both of which
were supported by Pew).101 This part reviews those findings and
recommendations, and then explains how they were implemented in SB
91.

92. Criminal Justice Reform, supra note 4.
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Letter from Gerard Asselin, President, Anchorage Police Dep’t
Emps. Ass’n et al., to Sen. John Coghill et al. (Apr. 7, 2016), http://www.akleg.
gov/basis/get_documents.asp?session=29&docid=66413.
95. ALASKA H. JOURNAL, 29th Leg., 2d Sess. 2796 (May 11, 2016).
96. ALASKA S. JOURNAL, 29th Leg., 2d Sess. 2795 (May 13, 2016).
97. Representative Andy Josephson: About Me, ALASKA HOUSE MAJORITY
COALITION, http://akhouse.org/rep_josephson/about/ (last visited Sept. 10,
2017).
98. JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 2.
99. Id. at 14.
100. Id. at 28.
101. See generally id. at 4–13 (laying out basis for ACJC’s recommendations).
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Employing Evidence-Based Pretrial Practices to Counter Alaska’s
Growing Pretrial Prison Population

Alaska’s pretrial prison population grew 81% between 2005 and
2014, with approximately one-in-four Alaskan inmates still awaiting
trial.102 Half of this pretrial population consisted of nonviolent
offenders.103
By law, in making pretrial release decisions courts consider the
danger that a defendant poses to the victims and to the community, as
well as the defendant’s likelihood of missing court dates.104 In practice
however, the ACJC cautioned, whether or not defendants ended up
spending time in prison prior to trial often depended simply upon
whether they could afford bail.105 The ACJC also found that low-risk
defendants, in many cases, might have their bail set relative to their risk,
yet still be unable to afford that bail, either because it was secured bail
(that is, paid upfront) or otherwise too expensive.106 Thus, defendants end
up in prison when the court may have intended that they were good
candidates for pretrial release.107
Further, implicit in the ACJC’s recommendations is the concern that
subjectivity in bail decisions is less desirable and unnecessary when
objectivity is available in the form of actuarial risk assessment tools.108
Objective risk assessment is a core idea that guides the JRI generally.109
The ACJC expressed serious concern about the practice of putting
more defendants awaiting trial behind bars. For instance, ACJC Chairman
Gregory Razo testified that Alaska’s bail practice disproportionately
affected rural Alaskans.110 The ACJC’s report added that the tendency to
put pretrial defendants in prison was especially problematic given the
risk of exposing low-level, low-risk defendants to prison’s harmful

102. Id. at 6.
103. Terry Schuster & Rachel Brushett, Alaska Data Analysis – Part 1: Prison
Drivers, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (June 18, 2005), http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/
sites/default/files/imported/acjc/pewpresent6-2015.pdf.
104. ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.006(b) (2010).
105. JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 8.
106. See id.
107. Id.
108. Cf. JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 6 (discussing effectiveness of objective tools).
109. See, e.g., LAVIGNE ET AL., supra note 8, at 21 fig.6 (naming risk assessment
as the most common JRI reform).
110. ALASKA S. FIN. COMM. MINUTES, 29th Leg. (Mar. 28, 2016) (statement of
Gregory P. Razo, Chair, Alaska Criminal Justice Comm’n at 2:27:50 PM).

34.2 NOTE - ROSENGART (DO NOT DELETE)

252

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

11/26/2017 7:01 PM

Vol. 34:2

criminogenic effects.111 It cited studies indicating that as a low-risk
defendant’s length of stay increases beyond twenty-four hours, so does
that defendant’s likelihood of recidivating.112 Pretrial incarceration also
carries significant consequences for the defendant’s likelihood of
pleading guilty,113 the defendant’s ability to present a compelling legal
defense,114 as well as the defendant’s likelihood of retaining employment
and sustaining familial and community bonds.115
Based on these observations, the ACJC made four recommendations
to “implement evidence-based [pretrial] practices.”116 Recommendation
One called for expanded use of citations, rather than arrests, for low-level,
nonviolent offenders to curb the flow of less serious offenders into
prison.117 While SB 91 continues to give law enforcement discretion in
some situations to make an arrest, it permits officers to issue a citation to
a person stopped for a class C felony, not just misdemeanors.118 That the
law stops short of the ACJC recommendation—which had actually
suggested that there be a presumption of citation for class C felonies119—is
a consequence of considerable pushback from law enforcement early on
in the committee process.120
Recommendation Two addressed the problem of low-risk
defendants being imprisoned because of their inability to pay bail.121 SB
91 completely rewrites section 12.30.011 of the Alaska Statutes122 to

111. JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 11; see also Steven N.
Durlauf & Daniel S. Nagin, Imprisonment and Crime: Can Both Be Reduced?, 10
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 13, 21–23 (2011) (reviewing literature on criminogenic
impact of exposure to imprisonment).
112. CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP ET AL., supra note 29, at 4.
113. Will Dobbie et al., The Effects of Pretrial Detention on Conviction, Future
Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges (unpublished
manuscript, July 2016), https://www.princeton.edu/~wdobbie/files/bail.pdf.
114. Johnston, supra note 26, at 319–20.
115. Melissa Neal, Bail Fail: Why the U.S. Should End the Practice of Using Money
for Bail, JUST. POL’Y INST (Sept. 11, 2012), http://www.justicepolicy.org/ uploads/
justicepolicy/documents/bailfail.pdf; see also ALASKA S. FIN. COMM. MINUTES, 29th
Leg. (Mar. 28, 2016) (statement of Gregory P. Razo, Chair, Alaska Criminal Justice
Comm’n at 3:08:48 PM) (describing how removing individuals from rural Alaskan
communities can be especially problematic).
116. JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 15.
117. Id.
118. See S.B. 91, 29th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 51 (Alaska 2016) (amending ALASKA
STAT. § 12.25.180).
119. JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 15.
120. See, e.g., ALASKA S. STATE AFFAIRS COMM. MINUTES, 29th Leg. (Feb. 18, 2016)
(statement of Officer Charles Baker, Anchorage Police Dep’t at 9:05:50 AM)
(illustrating practical issues of citation presumption).
121. JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 15.
122. See Alaska S.B. 91 § 59 (repealing and reenacting ALASKA STAT. §
12.30.011).
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generally mirror a table in the ACJC report.123 The outcome can be
summarized in three points:
•

For low- and moderate-risk misdemeanants, as well as Class C
felons not charged with domestic violence or driving under the
influence (DUI), personal-recognizance release or unsecured
bail is mandatory.

•

For low-risk DUI or domestic violence defendants, as well as
certain other specified defendants, there is a presumption of
personal-recognizance release or unsecured bail. The
presumption is rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence
that nonmonetary conditions could not ensure the defendant’s
appearance and the community’s safety. The same is true for
moderate- and high-risk DUI defendants, high-risk nonpersonal misdemeanants, moderate-risk non-domestic violence
class C felons, and other low-risk defendants.

•

Defendants who are high-risk class C felons and have been
charged with failure to appear or violation of conditions of
release (VCOR) may be required to post appearance, bail, or
performance bonds.124

These changes more precisely tie a defendant’s pretrial detention or
release to his objectively-determined “risk,” reducing the probability of
detention based solely on the defendant’s inability to pay bail. To that
end, SB 91 also allows a defendant to provide information about his
inability to post the ordered bail when petitioning the court to have his
bail conditions reconsidered.125 Previously, the law expressly forbade
courts from considering a defendant’s inability to pay in the decision to
set bail.126
Perhaps the bigger reform here is how the risk determination works,
which was not fully determined in the legislation. SB 91 requires the
Corrections Commissioner to approve “a risk assessment instrument that
is objective, standardized, and developed based on analysis of empirical
data and risk factors relevant to pretrial failure, that evaluates likelihood
of failure to appear [or recidivate], and that is validated on the state’s
pretrial population.”127 Once developed and validated, pretrial services
officers will use the tool to provide judges with a risk assessment report

123. See JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 16 (illustrating
recommended pretrial release rules in tabular form).
124. Alaska S.B. 91 § 59 (setting forth new rules for pretrial release).
125. See id. § 57 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.006(d)).
126. Id.
127. See id. § 117 (creating ALASKA STAT. § 33.07.010–040); see also infra Section
III.D (noting absence of any determination of what risk assessment tool will look
like prior to enactment of SB 91).
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that designates the defendant as low-, moderate-, or high-risk, and to offer
judges a release recommendation based on the defendant’s risk rating and
the new statutory requirements.128
Recommendations Three and Four called for improvements in
pretrial supervision,129 which SB 91 implements in three particularly
significant ways. First, the state’s new pretrial services officers are vested
with power to make arrests without a warrant where there is probable
cause for a crime or VCOR.130 Second, SB 91 streamlines the bail condition
review process by ordering courts to revise bail conditions for defendants
who have been in custody for forty-eight hours and cannot pay bail,
unless the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that less
restrictive conditions cannot ensure public safety or the defendant’s
appearance.131 Third, SB 91 limits a court’s ability to appoint a third-party
custodian,132 thereby creating a strong preference for supervision by
pretrial services or some other condition of release, such as electronic
monitoring. The main problem with the preference for third-party
custodians was that willing and suitable individuals could be difficult to
find, thus leading to incarceration by default.133
B.

Shifts in Sentencing to Focus Prison Beds on Serious and Violent
Offenders

The ACJC reached two general conclusions regarding the impact of
sentencing on Alaska’s increasing prison population. First, presumptions
of active jail time at the low end of the offense hierarchy were causing
more low-level, nonviolent offenders to enter prison.134 Three-quarters of
the state’s inmates were nonviolent offenders, and over half of those
nonviolent offenders were misdemeanants.135 In 2014, 82% of all prison
admissions were misdemeanants, most of those nonviolent as well.136 To

128. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (describing new pretrial release
rules).
129. JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 16–17.
130. See Alaska S.B. 91 § 117 (creating ALASKA STAT. § 33.07.030(g)).
131. See id. § 56 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.006).
132. See id. §§ 62–63 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.021).
133. ALASKA H. FIN. COMM. MINUTES, 29th Leg. (Apr. 20, 2016) (statement of
Gregory P. Razo, Chair, Alaska Criminal Justice Comm’n at 3:04:16 PM)
(discussing barriers created by reliance of third-party custodians).
134. See generally JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 18–19
(suggesting sentencing reductions for low-level offenders).
135. Id. at 2, 9 fig.3.
136. Id. at 18.
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this point, the ACJC re-emphasized that exposure to prison could increase
the likelihood of low-level offenders recidivating, as compared to noncustodial sanctions.137
Second, the ACJC noted that felony offenders were staying in prison
longer, with the length of prison stays steadily increasing between 2005
and 2014.138 But the ACJC also determined that longer terms of
incarceration were not adding value or improving public safety insofar as
they were not reducing recidivism.139 Recommendations Five through
Ten, therefore, generally worked to keep low-risk individuals out of
prison in the first place, and then shorten the amount of time offenders
ultimately spend inside.
These recommendations lead to seven general changes. First,
presumptive misdemeanor sentences have been relaxed to thirty days
(down from one year) for most class A misdemeanors140 and down to ten
days (from ninety days) for most class B misdemeanors.141 The exceptions
are mostly tied to violent or sexual offenses, which remain at pre-SB 91
levels.142
Second, SB 91 downgrades violations of parole conditions and
failures to appear from misdemeanors to violations, except when the
violator intends to avoid prosecution or fails to make contact for thirty
days after a hearing.143 In those cases, the classification would be tied to
the underlying charge.144 However, SB 54, if passed, would return
violations of conditions of release to a class B misdemeanor.145
Third, SB 91 changes punishments related to DUI and driving with
a suspended license (DWLS). It reduces DWLS from a class A
misdemeanor to an infraction, so long as the underlying basis for
suspension was not itself a DUI or refusal to submit to a chemical test
(“Refusal”).146 If it was, the punishment is ten days of suspended
imprisonment.147 Furthermore, SB 91 responds to concerns of
overcrowding in community residential centers (CRCs), caused by high
volumes of DUI/Refusal cases, by requiring seventy-two hour
137. Id. at 9.
138. Id. at 10.
139. Id. at 9.
140. See S.B. 91, 29th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 91 (Alaska 2016) (amending ALASKA
STAT. § 12.55.135(a)).
141. See id. § 92 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.135(b)).
142. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.135(a)(1), (b)(2) (2016) (listing specific crimes for
which heightened punishment applies).
143. See Alaska S.B. 91 §§ 27–31 (amending ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.56.730, 757).
144. Id.
145. S.B. 54, 30th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. § 2 (Alaska 2017).
146. See Alaska S.B. 91 §§ 104–05 (repealing and reenacting ALASKA STAT. §
28.15.291).
147. Id.
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mandatory minimums to be served on electronic monitoring rather than
in the CRCs.148 Where electronic monitoring is unavailable, the
Commissioner of Corrections will determine another method that
involves serving time in a private residence.149
Fourth, SB 91 relaxes drug penalties. Prior to SB 91, the law defined
six degrees of misconduct involving controlled substances (MICS): MICS1 was the most severe and MICS-6 was the least. The new regime repeals
MICS-6, and then downgrades the offense classifications for MICS-2
through MICS-5.150 That is, MICS-5 goes from a class A misdemeanor to
a class B misdemeanor;151 MICS-4 goes from a class C felony, to a class A
misdemeanor;152 and so on. In addition, MICS-4 and MICS-5 are no longer
punishable by active prison sentences for an individual’s first two
convictions.153
Commercial drug offenses—delivery, manufacture, and possession
with intent—have also been downgraded in some cases, with the quantity
involved now becoming the determinative factor for offense
classification. In other words, whereas quantity had previously been an
aggravator154 or a mitigator155 to the presumptive sentence, now, the
quantity involved in the offense may form the basis for the offense’s
classification.156 To illustrate, a commercial offense of a Schedule IA
substance had previously been a class A felony with the potential for
sentence mitigation if only a small quantity of the substance was
involved. Under SB 91 though, if there is indeed a small quantity of the
substance involved, less than a gram or twenty-five tablets, the offense is
a class C felony.157 Likewise, with Schedule IIA or IIIA substances, a
commercial offense involving less than 2.5 grams or fifty tablets is also a
class C felony, rather than a class B felony.158
148. See id. § 107 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(k)); id. § 110 (amending
ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.032(o)).
149. See id. § 107 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(k)); id. § 110 (amending
ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.032(o)).
150. See id. (reclassifying ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.71.030–060).
151. Compare id. § 47 (deleting MICS-5 as a class A misdemeanor in ALASKA
STAT. § 11.71.050(b)), with id. § 48 (inserting MICS-5 as a class B misdemeanor in
ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.060(b)).
152. Compare id. § 46 (deleting MICS-4 as a class C felony in ALASKA STAT. §
11.71.040(d)), with id. § 47 (inserting MICS-4 as a class A misdemeanor in ALASKA
STAT. § 11.71.050(b)).
153. See id. § 93 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.135(n)(1)).
154. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(d)(25).
155. Id. § 12.55.155(d)(13), (15).
156. Alaska S.B. 91 § 45 (inserting subsection (a)(11) into ALASKA STAT. §
11.71.040).
157. See generally id. §§ 45–47 (prescribing new classifications for MICS
offenses).
158. See generally id. (prescribing new classifications for MICS offenses).
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Considering decades of practice in controlled substance aggravation
and mitigation,159 this is a dramatic change. But the new regime is not
without trade-offs. On one hand, SB 91 provides resolution to the problem
of applying vague standards for so-called “small” and “large” quantities
that had begun to vex courts.160 SB 91 drafters also indicated that the
clarifications would help “differentiate between the drug trafficker and
someone who presumably is selling to support their habit.”161 That is, it
reserves more severe punishment, like incarceration, for someone who
warrants it while helping spare defendants who might be better served
by rehabilitation.
On the other hand, advocates conceded that the prescribed quantity
thresholds may be arbitrary.162 In fact, without any apparent evidencebased reason, as is fundamental to JRI,163 the threshold was reduced from
the initially proposed five grams down to 2.5 grams.164 The change was
apparently precipitated by pushback from the Department of Law and
State Troopers,165 but at least one police department suggested that a 2.5
gram threshold would let serious dealers off too easily.166
Fifth, SB 91 employs a similar tactic for property theft by adjusting
thresholds to soften classifications and penalties. It does so in three ways,
all of which were controversial in the legislature. First, SB 91 eliminated
active imprisonment for first and second convictions for theft in the fourth
degree (under $250 in stolen value).167 For all repeat offenses thereafter,
the maximum sentence is five days suspended jail time and six months
probation.168

159. See, e.g., Knight v. State, 855 P.2d 1347, 1348 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993)
(upholding sentencing court’s determination that 10.5 grams of cocaine was
“small quantity” under mitigator statute); see also Waters v. State, 483 P.2d 199,
201 (Alaska 1971) (considering “small quantities” in determining drug sentence
prior to use of presumptive sentencing).
160. See, e.g., Hoekzema v. State, 193 P.3d 765, 771–72 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008)
(questioning whether determination that drug quantity is “large” or “small” is
question of fact or law).
161. ALASKA S. JUDICIARY COMM. MINUTES, 29th Leg. (Mar. 9, 2016) (statement
of Jordan Schilling, Staff, Sen. John Coghill at 2:42:01 PM).
162. Id.
163. LAVIGNE ET AL., supra note 8, at v.
164. Id.
165. ALASKA S. JUDICIARY COMM. MINUTES, 29th Leg. (Mar. 11, 2016) (statement
of Craig Richards, Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Law at 2:29:19 PM).
166. ALASKA H. FIN. COMM. MINUTES, 29th Leg. (Apr. 19, 2016) (statement of
Craig Richards, Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Law at 1:46:56 PM).
167. See S.B. 91, 29th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 93 (Alaska 2016) (adding subsection
(l)(2) into ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.135).
168. See id. (adding subsection (l)(1) into ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.135).
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The motivating concern was that many of these low-level offenders
were drug users supporting habits by stealing toiletries and alcohol, and
so it was concluded that treatment was more appropriate than
imprisonment.169 But there was some concern that such leniency may
allow repeat offenders to carry on criminal propensities, quite literally,
with impunity. Such an individual could hypothetically steal in small
quantities as frequently as he desired and then avoid ever serving prison
time so long as he was not caught more than once every six months. And
even if he was caught more than twice, the sentence would only be five
days imprisonment. One legislator claimed that the change “virtually
decriminalizes theft under $250,”170 and a municipal prosecutor warned
that criminals would wise up to the law.171 Ultimately, SB 54, if passed,
would reinstate some potential for incarceration with a five-day
suspended sentence for a first offense, a five-day active sentence for a
second offense, and a ten-day active sentence for the third offense and
every offense thereafter.172
The second change to property theft sentencing, an adjustment to the
felony threshold, was perhaps the most contentious in the bill. SB 91
raised the felony threshold—the value of property stolen that separates a
class C felony from a class A misdemeanor—from $750 to $1000.173 The
history of this change actually predates SB 91, when the threshold was
increased to $750 from $500 by SB 64.174 From there, the ACJC
recommended, and the original draft of SB 91 provided for, a $2000
threshold.175 The rationale for this proposed 400% increase was that the
original $500 threshold would stand at $1800 by 2015 if it were adjusted
for inflation.176 Moreover, the ACJC noted that twenty-three states had
made similar inflation adjustments without any demonstrated
detrimental impact on property crime rates.177

169. Hollander, supra note 14.
170. Lora Reinbold, My Turn: A Society’s Laws Define What is Impermissible and
Thereby What is Condoned, JUNEAU EMPIRE (July 17, 2016), http://juneauempire.
com/opinion/2016-07-17/my-turn-societys-laws-define-what-impermissibleand-thereby-what-condoned.
171. See ALASKA H. JUDICIARY COMM. MINUTES, 29th Leg. (Apr. 13, 2016)
(statement of Michael Shaffer, Prosecutor, Municipality of Anchorage at 5:53:08
PM) (criticizing jailable offense threshold).
172. S.B. 54, 30th Leg., 1st Sess. § 10 (Alaska 2017).
173. See Alaska S.B. 91 §§ 6–15, 18–23 (changing $750 to $1000 throughout
Chapter 46 of Title 11).
174. See generally 2014 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 83 (changing $500 to $750
throughout Chapter 46 of Title 11).
175. JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 20.
176. Id. at 19–20.
177. Id.
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The $2000 proposal encountered almost immediate pushback from
small businesses who worried about enabling thieves, 178 prompting the
Senate State Affairs Committee to restore the threshold to $750.179
Nevertheless, the Senate Finance Committee subsequently reinstated the
$2000 threshold.180 When SB 91 reached the House though, the House
Finance Committee, by a vote of five to six, failed to adopt the Senate’s
$2000 threshold to replace a House-authored $1000 threshold proposal.181
Thus, the $1000 threshold became the official position of SB 91.
The third change to property theft offenses was to subject both those
thresholds—the $250 for a non-jailable offense threshold as well as the
$1000 felony threshold—to an inflation readjustment every five years.182
As a matter of policy, employing an automatic inflation adjustment
mechanism stimulated vigorous debate.183 The argument for this
provision was that the Alaska legislature, despite its insistences in other
contexts that it would periodically make inflation adjustments, often fails
to pass the needed follow-up legislation.184 Thus, by bypassing the
178. See ALASKA S. STATE AFFAIRS COMM. MINUTES, 29th Leg. (Feb. 13, 2016)
(statement of Chris Nettles, President, NFIB of Alaska at 12:49:42 PM) (opposing
raising felony theft threshold to $2000).
179. ALASKA S. STATE AFFAIRS COMM. MINUTES, 29th Leg. (Mar. 3, 2016)
(statement of Daniel George, Staff, Sen. Bill Stoltze at 8:36:57 AM).
180. See ALASKA S. FIN. COMM. MINUTES, 29th Leg. (Apr. 2, 2016) (debate among
committee members at 11:10:31 AM). This was one of the few amendments in
committee in SB 91’s entire legislative history that required a vote. The
amendment was adopted five-to-two. Id. at 11:51:42 AM.
181. ALASKA H. FIN. COMM. MINUTES, 29th Leg. (Apr. 27, 2016) (committee vote
at 5:53:20 PM). There appears to be a clerical error in the minutes. Representative
Gara had offered two amendments, one pertaining to the $2000 threshold and
another pertaining to periodic adjustment for inflation. “Misunderst[anding],”
Representative Gara initially withdrew the former amendment when he had
intended to withdraw the latter and vote on the former. Debate then proceeded
on whether to raise the felony theft threshold to $2000. Thereafter, according to
the audio, a vote was taken on whether to raise the felony theft threshold to $2000.
However, the minutes, despite correct transcription up to that point, indicate the
vote was taken on the periodic inflation adjustment, which had been, upon
correction, withdrawn by Representative Gara. See id.
182. See S.B. 91, 29th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. §§ 6–15, 18–23 (Alaska 2016) (inserting
“adjusted for inflation as provided in AS 11.46.982” throughout Chapter 46 of
Title 11).
183. See, e.g., ALASKA H. FIN. COMM. MINUTES, 29th Leg. (Apr. 27, 2016) (debate
among committee members at 5:30:35 PM).
184. House Floor Session: S.B. 91 Omnibus Criminal Law Procedure, 29th Leg.,
2d Reg. Sess. (Alaska May 3, 2016) (statement of Rep. Jonathan Kreiss-Tomkins at
4:36
PM),
http://www.360north.org/gavel/video/?clientID=2147483647
&eventID=2016051012 (noting recurring problem of the legislature failing to make
inflation adjustments). Contra House Floor Session: S.B. 91 Omnibus Criminal
Law Procedure, 29th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Alaska May 3, 2016) (statement of Rep.
Bob Herron at 4:31 PM), http://www.360north.org/gavel/video/?clientID=
2147483647&eventID=2016051012 (expressing concern about taking legislative
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legislative process through delegation to the Judicial Council, SB 91
ensures that inflation adjustments actually happen.
There might be some concern whether this manner of adjusting for
inflation provides constitutionally sufficient notice.185 As enacted, the
statute provides that the Alaska Judicial Council, a state agency186 within
the judicial branch,187 shall “publish a report” calculating the inflationadjusted thresholds every five years.188 This calculation is to be “based on
a formula provided by the Department of Labor and Workforce
Development, reflecting the change in the Consumer Price Index for the
Anchorage metropolitan area compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
United States Department of Labor.”189 SB 91 says nothing explicitly,
however, about implementation; it merely states that the published report
will be delivered to several legal departments and legislative clerks.190
The revised offense statutes, furthermore, say only that the offense
classifications are related to property value as “adjusted for inflation as
provided in AS 11.46.982.”191 The statute, therefore, does not itself close
the loop on the relevant circumstance (i.e., the property value). In other
words, the new threshold level might never actually make it into the
criminal code; it would only be incorporated by reference to the
Department of Labor and Workforce Development’s published report.
Sixth, SB 91 decreases felony presumptive sentences to correct for the
unintended increases in sentences following Blakely.192 The result is that
the pre-Blakely presumptive terms, which SB 56 had put at the floor of the
post-Blakely presumptive ranges, now fall into the middle of the
presumptive ranges.193 For illustration, consider a second class A felony
conviction.194 In 2004, the presumptive term would have been ten years
imprisonment.195 The following year, in response to Blakely, SB 56 created
a four-year presumptive range with ten years imprisonment at the

matter out of hands of legislature).
185. See Larson v. State, 564 P.2d 365, 372 (Alaska 1977) (recognizing
constitutional requirement of “adequate notice of the conduct that is prohibited”).
186. ALASKA STAT. § 44.99.240(2)(C) (2016).
187. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 8.
188. Alaska S.B. 91 § 25.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. §§ 6–15, 18–23.
192. See supra notes 31–41 and accompanying text (describing move to
presumptive ranges following Blakely).
193. S.B. 91, 29th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. §§ 88–89 (Alaska 2016).
194. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(c)(3) (2016).
195. 2005 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 2, § 1 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(c)(3)
to delete presumptive term of ten years imprisonment).
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floor.196 Consequently, the range was ten years to fourteen years.197 Under
SB 91, the same second class A felony conviction will carry a presumptive
range of eight to twelve years. 198 Accordingly, the original ten-year term
is returned to the middle of the presumptive range, making it a standard
sentence, rather than at the floor of the presumptive range, or what might
be considered a lenient sentence.
While this type of revision affects most felony convictions, SB 91 also
removes any presumption of prison time for first-time class C felonies
(previously a zero to two year presumptive sentence), and instead calls
for probation with eighteen months imprisonment suspended.199 The
change, which was emphatically contested in the House Finance
Committee,200 creates a peculiar problem whereby a class A misdemeanor
may now warrant more jail time, zero to thirty days, than a class C
felony.201 The paradox did not go unnoticed, and restoring a presumption
of up to one year of imprisonment for a first class C felony conviction may
be the most significant rollback of SB 91 that SB 54 would implement, if
passed.202
Seventh and lastly, Recommendations Nine and Ten, along with
Recommendations Fifteen and Sixteen, advocated alterations to parole
and probation.203 Among other changes, SB 91 reduces the length of
probation time a court can impose for most felonies;204 enhances the
impact of electronic monitoring by entitling offenders to good time
deductions for time spent on electronic monitoring;205 expedites
offenders’ exit from the corrections system by creating new systems of
administrative parole (which streamlines the application and hearing
process for some low-level, nonviolent misdemeanants)206 and geriatric
parole (which permits discretionary parole for inmates over the age of 60
who have served ten years of a non-sex or unclassified felony);207
196. S.B. 56, 24th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. § 8 (Alaska 2005) (inserting presumptive
range of ten to fourteen years imprisonment).
197. Id.
198. See Alaska S.B. 91 § 88 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(c)(3)).
199. See id. § 90 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(e)(1)).
200. See, e.g., ALASKA H. FIN. COMM. MINUTES, 29th Leg. (Apr. 27, 2016)
(statement of Rep. Lance Pruitt at 6:19:34 PM).
201. Compare Alaska S.B. 91 § 90 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(e)(1) to
create presumption of probation for first class C felony conviction with eighteen
months suspended), with id. § 91 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.135(a) to create
a presumption of up to thirty days active imprisonment for a class A
misdemeanor conviction).
202. S.B. 54, 30th Leg., 1st Sess. § 6 (Alaska 2017).
203. JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 20–21, 24–25.
204. See Alaska S.B. 91 § 79 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.090(c)).
205. See id. § 154 (repealing and reenacting ALASKA STAT. § 33.20.010(c)).
206. See id. § 122 (creating ALASKA STAT. § 33.16.089).
207. See id. § 123 (creating ALASKA STAT. § 33.16.089(a)(2)).
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broadens eligibility for discretionary parole;208 and facilitates early
discharge recommendations for offenders who have completed treatment
and have satisfied other imposed conditions.209
It is worth noting that the legislature did not adopt Recommendation
Eleven, which suggested removing exclusions from receiving earned time
credit imposed upon unclassified, class A, and recidivist sex felons.210 The
ACJC’s view was that earned time incentivized completion of treatment
for these offenders, and so had a positive cost-benefit ratio.211 Although
the recommendation, like all others, was adopted by consensus, Brenda
Stanfill, the designated victims’ advocate commissioner, testified that the
recommendation made victims’ services “a little nervous.”212 Ultimately,
Senator Coghill lobbied for the recommendation’s exclusion from the
legislation, arguing that sex offenses, as a class, were considerably more
complicated and visceral than many other reforms included in SB 91, and
so warranted separate and more careful consideration by the
legislature.213 Accordingly, Alaska’s sex offense laws remain virtually
untouched by SB 91.
C.

Improved Supervision and Intervention to Reduce Recidivism

The ACJC’s third set of recommendations respond to its finding that
the State’s scarce supervisory resources were overstretched, and should
therefore be focused on offenders who were most likely to recidivate.214
The ACJC also determined that re-incarceration was too often imposed
upon technical violators who had not committed any new crime.215 The
ACJC also noted that parolees were being kept under State supervision
for longer periods of time, even though violations most frequently
occurred in the first three months.216 This meant that the State was
spending more time and money on individuals whose criminal risk had

208. See id. § 124 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 33.16.090(b) by creating new
eligibility); id. §§ 125, 127 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 33.16.100).
209. See id. §§ 80–81 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.090); id. §§ 143–44
(amending ALASKA STAT. § 33.16.120).
210. JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 22.
211. Id.
212. ALASKA H. FIN. COMM. MINUTES, 29th Leg. (Apr. 19, 2016) (statement of
Brenda Stanfill, Comm’r, Alaska Criminal Justice Comm’n at 3:17:01 PM).
213. ALASKA H. FIN. COMM. MINUTES, 29th Leg. (Apr. 20, 2016) (statement of
Sen. John Coghill at 9:46:00 AM).
214. See JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 11–14 (discussing
inefficiencies in community supervision).
215. Id. at 23.
216. Id. at 13.
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likely subsided.217 In sum, according to the ACJC, the State was not
effectively or efficiently managing its probation and parole
populations.218
To reform post-incarceration sanctions, the ACJC recommended the
development of “swift, certain, and proportional” sanctions for technical
violations of community supervision, like missed drug tests and
treatment sessions.219 Through rewrites of title 33 of the Alaska Statutes,
SB 91 authorizes the Commissioner of Corrections to develop and
implement such a system.220 Relatedly, the ACJC was concerned that
technical violators of parole and probation conditions, who made up a
quarter of the Alaskan prison population, were spending too long (an
average of 106 days) behind bars despite having committed no new
crime.221 SB 91 responds by capping the length of their re-incarceration at
generally just a few days.222
If those recommendations might be thought of as offering the State
more proportionate and effective sanctions to apply, then
Recommendation Fourteen might be considered to direct more appealing
incentives towards offenders. The ACJC sought to make it easier for
“compliant and low risk offenders [to] earn their way off supervision,”223
which SB 91 achieves by changing the State’s earned compliance credit
system to grant one-for-one credit for every thirty days an offender goes
without a violation.224
Recommendation Seventeen concerned the effectiveness of the
State’s Alcohol Safety Action Program (ASAP).225 ASAP was originally
established to address the needs of DUI offenders,226 but unintentionally
grew into a general alcoholism and substance abuse treatment
program.227 The ACJC initially expressed a desire to expand ASAP
through grant funding to meet substance abusers’ needs, but

217. Id.
218. Id. at 12–14.
219. Id. at 22–23.
220. See S.B. 91, 29th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. §§ 114–15, 141 (Alaska 2016) (rewriting
portions of Title 33).
221. JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 23.
222. Alaska S.B. 91 §§ 84, 145 (limiting length of imprisonment for technical
violation of probation or parole conditions to three, five, and ten days for first
three violations, respectively).
223. JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 24.
224. Alaska S.B. 91 §§ 114, 151.
225. JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 25–26.
226. ALASKA S. FIN. COMM. MINUTES, 29th Leg. (Apr. 2, 2016) (statement of
Jordan Schilling, Staff, Sen. John Coghill at 12:45:20 PM).
227. See JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 25 (expressing concern
about ASAP’s limited effectiveness given burden imposed upon it).
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“recognize[d] that, in the current fiscal climate, this is unlikely.”228
Accordingly, it instead recommended that ASAP eligibility be confined
to the originally-intended eligibility requirements (DUI, Refusal, and
habitual minor consuming alcohol offenders),229 which SB 91
effectuates.230
Finally, while recognizing the capacity of community residential
centers (CRCs) to reduce recidivism, the ACJC also cautioned that their
efficacy was being hindered by intermingling low-, moderate-, and highrisk offenders.231 With the aid of the new risk assessment tool, SB 91 tasks
the Commissioner of Corrections with ensuring that CRCs achieve their
rehabilitative objectives.232
D.

Victims and Additional Provisions

SB 91 includes other provisions based on the ACJC’s
recommendations. For example, SB 91 has scattered provisions that
increase notice and information dissemination to victims233 in response to
the ACJC’s final recommendation.234 Per Recommendation Nineteen,235
SB 91 provides for continuing oversight and review by the ACJC.236 The
ACJC’s mandate has been extended four years, through 2021,237 and its
annual reports must include statistical summaries of savings,
reinvestment, and performance metrics created by SB 91, along with
additional recommendations if appropriate.238
SB 91 also includes provisions that are not derived from the ACJC’s
recommendations. One example is section 77, which creates a new option
for suspended entry of judgment, whereby some convicted offenders may

228. Id.
229. Id. at 236.
230. See S.B. 91, 29th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 170 (Alaska 2016) (amending ALASKA
STAT. § 47.37.040(21)); see also id. § 171 (supplementing ALASKA STAT. §
47.37.130(h)).
231. JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 26.
232. See Alaska S.B. 91 § 159 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 33.30.151).
233. See, e.g., id. § 65 (creating new subsection ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.011(b)); id.
§§ 94–97 (amending ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.61.015–017); id. § 122 (creating ALASKA
STAT. § 33.16.089); id. §§ 131–33 (amending ALASKA STAT. §§ 33.16.120–130); id. §
141 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 33.16.180).
234. JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 28.
235. Id. at 27.
236. Alaska S.B. 91 §§ 163–67.
237. Id. § 167.
238. Id. § 166.
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have their guilty judgment deferred while they attempt to complete a
probationary program.239 If successful, the court will dismiss the case.240
Otherwise, the judgment will be issued and a sentence imposed.241
There was also the frequently debated question of drug testing
convicted drug felons to regain federal temporary assistance and food
stamp eligibility. The federal rule is that drug felons are ineligible for that
assistance.242 Since 1996 however, states have been permitted to
affirmatively opt-out of the requirement.243 Under SB 91, Alaska joined
the majority of states by taking up that option, albeit to a limited extent.244
Section 169 of SB 91 allows MICS-1 through MICS-4 offenders to receive
federal welfare if they demonstrate to the Department of Health and
Social Services that they have satisfied at least one of four prescribed
conditions related to treatment.245 Drug testing, which was a serious point
of contention in committee,246 is not included among those.

III. THE FUTURE: CONSIDERING THE CONCERNS AND ISSUES THAT
MIGHT LIE AHEAD FOR SB 91
SB 91 is likely the most sweeping change to Alaska’s criminal code
since statehood.247 Furthermore, it is part of a sea change in criminal
justice reform occurring across the country.248 The law’s potential
consequences are many. This Part highlights five potential issues to guide
evaluation of SB 91’s provisions. First, it looks at how SB 91—that is,
Alaska’s version of justice reinvestment—compares to academic calls for
criminal justice reform and alternative conceptions of justice
reinvestment. Next, it highlights a particular concern with the
239. Id. § 77 (creating ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.078).
240. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.078(d) (2016).
241. Id. § 12.55.078(e).
242. MAGGIE MCCARTY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42394, DRUG TESTING
AND CRIME-RELATED RESTRICTIONS IN TANF, SNAP, AND HOUSING ASSISTANCE 1
(2016).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 9 tbl.1, 13 tbl.2.
245. See S.B. 91, 29th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 169 (Alaska 2016) (creating ALASKA
STAT. § 47.27.015(i)).
246. Compare, e.g., ALASKA S. FIN. COMM. MINUTES, 29th Leg. (Mar. 28, 2016)
(statement of Sen. John Coghill at 1:33:30 PM) (arguing in favor of drug testing),
with, e.g., ALASKA S. STATE AFFAIRS COMM. Minutes, 29th Leg. (Mar. 8, 2016)
(statement of Grace Singh, Assistant to the President, Cent. Council of Tlingit &
Haida Indian Tribes of Alaska at 9:43:08 AM) (opposing drug testing for felons as
causing unfair logistical problems for Alaska Natives).
247. Brooks, supra note 3.
248. See generally THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 1 (showing justice
reinvestment efforts in over thirty states); see also JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT,
supra note 6, at 1 (noting JRI initiatives throughout the country).
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legislature’s judgment on implementing a violent crime demarcation.
Third, it considers the experience of two states, Mississippi and South
Dakota, that might foreshadow Alaska’s future with SB 91. Fourth, it
discusses the caution that should be attended to risk assessment. Finally,
it looks at how SB 91 might particularly impact Alaska Natives, who make
up a considerable part of the prison system, and discussed the need for
greater emphasis on reinvestment.
A.

Does SB 91 Do Criminal Justice “The Right Way”?

Many criminal justice reform advocates might contest labelling SB
91 as “justice reinvestment.”249 Others still might go even further,
maligning SB 91 as mere budget-slashing technocratic tinkering
unworthy of the label “criminal justice reform” at all.250 To understand
these concerns, it is worth exploring the history of the idea of justice
reinvestment further. This Note, for the most part, has described justice
reinvestment as it has been executed by the JRI—that is, Pew, the U.S.
Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), and working
groups established in the states, such as the ACJC in Alaska. Since 2007,
the JRI has controlled the working model of justice reinvestment.251 As the
ACJC described the model, justice reinvestment is a revision of
“sentencing and corrections policies to focus state prison beds on violent
and habitual offenders and then reinvest[ ] a portion of the savings from
averted prison growth into more effective strategies to reduce
recidivism.”252
But the idea of justice reinvestment predates 2007 and the earlier
form took a much different angle. Whereas the JRI model is highly
technical and focused on the macro level, the original concept of justice
249. See JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., ENDING MASS INCARCERATION: CHARTING A NEW
JUSTICE REINVESTMENT 1, 9–14 (2013), http://www.justicestrategies.net/sites/
default/files/publications/Charting%20a%20New%20Justice%20Reinvestment.
pdf (arguing that JRI has become overly formalized and focused on the number
of prisoners, and so departed from original purpose of “justice reinvestment” to
combat the causes of crime).
250. See, e.g., MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE
LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS 143, 302, 307 (2015) (criticizing reinvestment as
insufficient to meet criminal justice challenges); Klingele, supra note 76, at 581–82
(criticizing “evidence-based practices,” like JRI, for picking “low hanging fruit,”
“nibbl[ing] at the edges,” and ultimately not showing significant difference vis-àvis non-JRI reforms); Michael Tonry, Making Peace, Not a Desert, 10 CRIMINOLOGY
& PUB. POL’Y 637, 637–38, 640, 647 (2011) (conceding that justice reinvestment may
be sensible, but calling it “unlikely to serve as a successful strategy for policy
change” and criticizing “liberal reform advocates” for acceding to its cost and
effectiveness framework).
251. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 1.
252. JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 5.
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reinvestment was focused more on root causes and particular
communities. In an early report on justice reinvestment by Susan B.
Tucker and Eric Cadora, reformers sought “community level solutions to
community level problems.”253 There was a much greater emphasis on the
reinvestment element of the program, as opposed to the data-driven
reform element, with money targeted toward stopping the cycle of
individuals in high incarceration neighborhoods—which were generally
minority communities—going to prison again and again.254
Joined by other commentators a decade later, Tucker and Cadora
reflected that justice reinvestment “was developed as a public safety
mechanism to downsize prison populations and budgets and re-allocate
savings to leverage the public and private resources for reinvestment in
minority communities disproportionately harmed by the system and
culture of harsh punishment.”255 The idea, in other words, was to build
stronger infrastructures to keep individuals in communities most
weakened by crime away from crime.256 Under JRI, they lament that
justice reinvestment “has come to stand for any corrections reform that is
expected to save states money and improve public safety, but without
concurrent reinvestment in the community . . . .”257 In sum, their
contention is that JRI has perpetuated the system of mass incarceration,
although perhaps with less intensity, whereas the original idea behind
justice reinvestment was to attempt to stop the conveyor belt.
Similarly, these progenitors-turned-critics have expressed concern
that JRI legislative programs, like SB 91, work top-down rather than
bottom-up, which is the opposite direction from the most successful
programs, and thereby stunt whatever benefit may be possible.258 In fact,
the argument goes, JRI legislative programs will mainly serve to
exacerbate current problems by expanding the scope of state control.259 In
Alaska, 553 state statutes already affect the lives of individuals with past

253. SUSAN B. TUCKER & ERIC CADORA, OPEN SOCIETY INST., JUSTICE
REINVESTMENT 2 (2003), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/
default/files/ideas_reinvestment.pdf.
254. See id. at 3–4.
255. AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 249, at 3.
256. See id. at 3–4.
257. Id. at 4.
258. See id. (criticizing JRI’s focus on state government policymakers to
exclusion of other constituencies and stakeholders); see also Judith A. Green &
Vincent Schiraldi, Better by Half: The New York City Story of Winning Large-Scale
Decarceration While Improving Public Safety, 29 FED. SENT’G REP. 22, 36 (2016)
(praising success of New York City’s “bottom-up, advocacy-driven, communityfocused strategy, as opposed to [justice reinvestment’s] top-down, technocratic,
elite-consensus approach”).
259. Klingele, supra note 76, at 540.
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convictions,260 and that is before the vastly larger galaxy of federal
statutes.261 SB 91 would only create more mandates, conditions, and
procedures for justice-involved individuals, which translates to more
difficult individual reformation and escape from the criminal justice
system. Ultimately, if the critics’ concern about the problems of elite
control is indeed valid, and there is compelling evidence that it may be
given New York City’s experience cutting its massive prison population
in half through bottom-up initiatives,262 then JRI might only entrench the
tendencies that enabled mass incarceration.263
There has also been an academic pile-on criticizing the JRI approach
for not targeting the roots of crime. Put broadly, the issue is that mass
incarceration problems run far deeper than what might possibly be
discernible from the aggregate data about prison populations and
sentences.264 Academic critics caution that data has led policymakers
astray before, and question whether data can even provide an accurate
picture in these circumstances where there are so many factors involved
that the data might not capture.265 Furthermore, they question the motive
of justice reinvestment, adding that “[c]riminal justice is
fundamentally . . . not . . . a dollars-and-cents problem.”266 One scholar
has derided JRI’s focus on “non, non, nons” (nonserious, nonviolent, and
nonsexual offenders) as only entrenching the “carceral state”267 and
diverting public attention away from the need for more serious reform
260. Deborah Periman, Prisoner Reentry and the Uniform Collateral Consequences
of Conviction Act, 27(4) ALASKA JUST. F. 1, 7 (Winter 2011).
261. Id.
262. See generally, Green & Schiraldi, supra note 258 (highlighting New York
City’s bottom-up, advocacy-driven, community-focused strategy that cut prison
population by roughly 50%).
263. Cf. Harvell et al., supra note 75, at 177 (emphasizing value of buy-in from
judges, district attorneys, and governors).
264. See Klingele, supra note 76, at 583 (arguing that data “is cool and
detached” from the uncomfortable truth that there is need for “culture change”).
See generally GOTTSCHALK, supra note 250.
265. See Klingele, supra note 76, at 561–62 (cautioning about data’s accuracy
and appeal).
266. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 250, at 37.
267. Gottschalk does not provide a precise definition of the “carceral state,”
but it may be analogized to the “welfare state,” affecting the country’s political,
economic, and social framework and characterized by the enormous size of the
American prison population; the state’s reliance on harsh and degrading
sanctions; and the disproportionate impact of those criminal sanctions upon lowincome, minority communities. See Marie Gottschalk, Bring It On: The Future of
Penal Reform, The Carceral State, and American Politics, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 559–
61 (2015); Marie Gottschalk, Democracy and the Carceral State in America, 651
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 288, 288–90 (2014); Marie Gottschalk,
Dismantling the Carceral State: The Future of Penal Policy Reform, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1693–
95 (2006).
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that is actually capable of more markedly reducing crime and
incarceration.268 The academy’s suggested reforms might include
reducing the scope of criminal offenses, changing policing practices, and
reforming prosecutorial discretion and decision-making.269 Any change
that legislation like SB 91 could produce, these critics claim, is only
making a difference, if any, at the margins.270
But is the academic hand-wringing over JRI, and its incumbent
emphasis on economics, overblown when compared to the political
realities of criminal justice reform?271 For better or for worse, criminal
justice is part of a politicized process.272 That means that political
incentives often drive what lawmakers do, or limit what they can do.273
One political consequence is public outcry against legislators who are
seen as “weak on crime.”274
268. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 250, at 143.
269. See generally TONRY, supra note 20, at 18–40 (describing needed reforms to
reduce flow into prisons).
270. See Katherine Beckett et al., The End of an Era? Understanding the
Contradictions of Criminal Justice Reform, 664 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. &
SOC. SCI. 238, 254 (2011) (suggesting that significant reduction in incarceration
rates will require more than marginal changes for low-level, nonviolent offenders,
which has not yet occurred); see also Tonry, supra note 250, at 638 (stating justice
reinvestment reforms have “mostly nibbled at the edges”).
271. But see JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS
INCARCERATION AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 179–80 (Basic Books 2017)
(recognizing political realities in penal policy and their impact on politicians and
influencers, but arguing that “scholars, the media, and advocacy groups” must
“ask these seemingly ‘impossible’ questions” anyhow).
272. See generally Michael Tonry Determinants of Penal Policy, in CRIME,
PUNISHMENT, AND POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE—CRIME AND JUSTICE: A
REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1–46 (Michael Tonry ed., 2007) (comparing United States
with other criminal justice systems where many criminal policymakers are civil
servants rather than elected politicians); see also GOTTSCHALK, supra note 250, at
176 (“increase in violent crime opened up enormous political space to redefine the
law-and-order problem and its solutions”); Heather Schoenfeld, Putting Politics in
Penal Policy Reform, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 715, 717 (2011) (arguing that
penal policy implementation involves responding to political incentives); Sara
Sun Beale, What’s Law Got To Do With It? The Political, Social, Psychological and Other
Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. L.
REV. 23, 29 (1997) (contrasting influence of politics on criminal justice in the United
States from other countries).
273. See Schoenfeld, supra note 272, at 717 (“[P]olitical incentives matter for policy
enactment and implementation.”) (emphasis original); see also Michael Tonry,
Evidence, Ideology, and Politics in the Making of American Criminal Justice, 42 CRIME
& JUST. 1, 8 (2013) (noting that on important issues, like criminal justice, change is
impeded by political dispositions); Sean Nicholson-Crotty, The Politics of Diffusion:
Public Policy in the American States, 71 J. OF POL. 192, 201 (2009) (finding, in a case
study of California’s adoption of Three Strikes sentencing policy, that there is
“significant evidence” that the legislature was focused on short-term electoral
gain rather than the merits of the policy itself).
274. See J.C. Olesen, A Decoupled System: Federal Criminal Justice and the
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Alaska’s experience since SB 91 is a case study in how sensitive
constituents are to perceptions that their elected representatives are
failing to keep their communities safe. As noted, the Department of Public
Safety reported in 2017 that crime in Alaska had increased in 2016 nearly
across the board.275 Notwithstanding that there is little evidence to
suggest that the increase in crime in Alaska between 2015 and 2016 was
caused by SB 91,276 Alaskans have expressed furor at legislators,277 leading
Governor Walker to put changes to the bill on the agenda for the special
legislative session in October, 2017.278 In September 2017, Senator Mia
Costello, who had co-sponsored SB 91 just a year earlier, acceded to the
uproar and announced that she would introduce a bill to repeal SB 91.279
She noted that constituents are “frustrated and angry, and we have a
responsibility to do something about it, now.”280 “Every Alaskan is

Structural Limits of Transformation, 35 JUST. SYSTEM J. 383, 394 (2014) (“[F]or
politicians who rely on popular support for reelection, appearing tough on crime
is traditionally a safe bet, while appearing weak on crime can be fatal,
professionally speaking.”) (internal citations omitted).
275. Bradner, supra note 18.
276. Anne Hillman, SB 91 and its Effect on Crime Rates, ALASKA PUB. MEDIA
(Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.alaskapublic.org/2017/09/29/sb-91-and-itseffects-on-crime-rates/ (audio recording with host and University of Alaska
Anchorage Professor Brad Myrstol discussing the conceptual problems with
pinning increase in crime to SB 91); see also Brad A. Myrstol & Pamela Cravez,
Crime Rates and Alaska Criminal Justice Reform, 34(2) ALASKA JUST. F. 1, 2 (Fall 2017).
277. See Andrew Kitchenman, As Anger Over Crime Boils Over, Alaska
Lawmakers Weigh Changes to Law, KTOO (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.ktoo.org/
2017/10/04/anger-crime-boils-lawmakers-weigh-changes-law/ (reporting on
outraged town hall participants who called for the death penalty and for letting
drug overdosers die); Victoria Taylor, Concerns of SB-91 Resolution Stall Assembly
Work Session, KTUU (Sept. 29, 2017), http://www.ktuu.com/content/news/
Concerns-of-SB91-resolution-stall-Assembly-worksession-448737023.html;
Liz
Kellar, After Public Condemnation, Criminal Justice Commission Recommends Some
Roll-Backs to SB 91, JUNEAU EMPIRE (Feb. 2, 2017), http://juneauempire.com/
local/2017-02-01/after-public-condemnation-criminal-justice-commissionrecommends-some-roll-backs-sb (quoting Senator Coghill as saying “[p]ublic
condemnation has played a huge part in [the need to amend SB 91] . . . We cannot
ignore the public, who feel so violated.”); Zaz Hollander, Parents of Slain Palmer
Teen Question Crime Bill as Defendants Appear Again in Court, ALASKA DISPATCH
NEWS (Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.adn.com/alaska-news/crime-courts/2016/
12/27/parents-of-slain-palmer-teen-question-crime-bill-as-defendants-appearagain-in-court/ (reporting on parents’ concern that teenagers accused of killing
their son had been released because of SB 91, even though prosecutors say the
issue was that prior offense was not prosecutable).
278. Bradner, supra note 18.
279. James Brooks, Former Backer of SB 91 Now Seeks its Repeal in Legislature,
JUNEAU EMPIRE (Sept. 27, 2017), http://juneauempire.com/news/state/2017-0927/former-backer-sb-91-now-seeks-its-repeal-legislature.
280. Id.
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suffering from either a burglary, theft or threat of these crimes, or worse,
making us feel unsafe in our own homes and neighborhoods,” she said,
adding to the hyperbole.281
Simply stated then, the premise that “current correctional practices
are morally unjustified,”282 as academic critics might posit, faces a tough
political fight against community outrage that neighborhoods are less
safe,283 that victims are the ‘losers’ of criminal justice reform,284 that
criminals—even the petty ones—have been emboldened by sentencing
leniency,285 that communities have been made less safe,286 and that—even
if untrue—innocent people are being killed by criminals who had been
released in the name of “criminal justice reform.”287 Accordingly,
legislators’ ability to pass criminal justice reform may be limited by their
ability to provide justification to their constituents.
The need for a compelling justification may also explain SB 91
advocates’ emphasis on the fiscal benefit that the law may provide.288
Particularly given Alaska’s distressed budgetary climate, 289 the ability to
281. Anchorage Lawmaker Costello Introduces Bill to Repeal SB 91, MAT-SU VALLEY
FRONTIERSMAN (Sept. 23, 2017), http://www.frontiersman.com/news/
anchorage-lawmaker-costello-introduces-bill-to-repeal-sb/article_266060d6a0c2-11e7-b359-37a70504a7df.html.
282. Klingele, supra note 76, at 567.
283. See supra notes 275–81 and accompanying text; see also ALASKA S. FIN.
COMM. MINUTES, 29th Leg. (Mar. 29, 2016) (statement of Sen. Peter Micciche at
9:16:38 AM) (“[P]art of the concerns of Alaskans is that because of a tightened
budget . . . that we are willing to . . . release potentially dangerous criminals back
into the community.”).
284. See generally, e.g., Eric Ruble, Office of Victims’ Rights: SB 91 is Well Intended,
Poorly Executed, KTVA-ALASKA (Feb. 23, 2016), http://live-ktva-ak.pantheonsite.
io/office-of-victims-rights-sb91-is-well-intended-poorly-executed-780/
(detailing OVR’s opposition to SB 91).
285. E.g., Kellar, supra note 277.
286. See, e.g., Alaska S. Fin. Comm. Minutes, 29th Leg. (Mar. 29, 2016)
(statement of Sen. Peter Micciche at 9:16:38 AM) (“[P]art of the concerns of
Alaskans is that because of a tightened budget . . . that we are willing to . . . release
potentially dangerous criminals back into the community.”).
287. Hollander, supra note 277 (reporting on parents’ concern that teenagers
accused of killing their son had been released because of SB 91, even though
prosecutors say the issue was that prior offense was not prosecutable); see also
ALASKA S. JUD. STANDING COMM. MINUTES, 30th Leg. (Mar. 3, 2017) (statement of
Butch Moore, at 2:28:18 PM) (claiming that the Fort Lauderdale Airport shooting
in Jan. 2017 was perpetrated by a man released in Alaska pursuant to SB 91). But
see, ALASKA S. JUD. STANDING COMM. MINUTES, 30th Leg. (Mar. 10, 2017) (statement
of Sen. John Coghill, at 1:34:57 PM) (disputing Moore’s testimony as factually
incorrect). These minutes refer to testimony given on March 6. See id. However,
there was no meeting on March 6, and the minutes likely intend to reference
testimony given at the March 3 hearing. See id.
288. See discussion supra Section I.C.
289. See Samuels, supra note 63 (noting Alaska’s multibillion dollar budget
deficit).
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point to a record of saving money is likely to be advantageous for any reelection motivated legislator. And given corrections’ costliness—
specifically, the lack of return on investment in terms of public safety for
dollars spent on punishment290—legislators seem likely to calculate that
surely something ought to be done,291 particularly when even so-called
marginal improvements can save tens of millions of dollars, as with SB
91.
What the academic critics fail to consider is that given the political
challenges surrounding criminal justice reform—the need for politicians
to avoid appearing soft on crime and the importance of appearing fiscally
responsible—SB 91 may be one of the only politically realistic options.292
Why, then, make the perfect the enemy of the good, particularly where
‘good’ might be all that is on the table given criminal justice’s
politicization and also where, as in Alaska, the fiscal need is so
pressing?293 In other words, viewed through a political lens, it is not
difficult to see why SB 91 came together as it did. As Professor Sean
Hopwood, a federal inmate turned criminal justice scholar and reform
advocate, said in describing Maryland’s JRI legislation:
[P]ragmatism has its pitfalls. It does not inspire us the way an
idealist’s call to action does. It moves gradually. It trades in
compromise. It demands less while crusaders demand more.
Still, it has its place in progressive reform in America. If it starts
with the feasible, it does so in the hope that the ideal may someday be
realized, at least in some measure. If it is modest, it does so with the
knowledge that by aiming lower it increases the chances of hitting its
target. Pragmatism is not always a panacea but, then again, neither is
it a path to nowhere.294

290. See discussion supra Section I.B (overviewing increasing corrections
budget and diminishing corrections outcomes).
291. See discussion supra Section I.C (arguing that state budget had substantial
impact on moving SB 91). But cf. Tonry, supra note 250, at 641 (noting that most
corrections costs are fixed, therefore gains unlikely to be substantial unless large
numbers of prisoners diverted or avoided).
292. See, e.g., Klingele, supra note 76, at 582 (“Defenders of the current
approach to reform emphasize that any decrease in prison growth is better than a
continuation of the soaring rates of custody that have defined the past forty years.
In this view, incremental improvement—or even stabilization—means more net
justice . . . .”).
293. See, e.g., Samuels, supra note 63 (discussing challenges of Alaska’s fiscal
situation).
294. Shon Hopwood, Book Review, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 445, 454 (2017)
(reviewing GOTTSCHALK, supra note 250) (emphasis added).
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Even if constrained, SB 91 makes important steps toward reducing
the massive scope of the criminal justice system, and that is cause for some
satisfaction. And while it is not everything that could be done, perhaps,
as even the originators of justice reinvestment acknowledge, initiatives
like SB 91 can pave the way for deeper and more politically challenging
mass incarceration reform.295 To this end, Professor Hopwood suggests
that JRI legislation may be a way to ensure that more is done by
facilitating understanding that “a more humane and fair criminal justice
system is a more effective one, and a more effective criminal justice
system benefits us all.”296
Nevertheless, the academic critics’ point about the need to think
harder, do more, and go further is well-reasoned and thoroughly
supported. The ACJC and the legislature would do well not to lose sight
of it as they evaluate SB 91. Stakeholders, therefore, should monitor the
state’s success with JRI, and use it as momentum for more.
B.

Does SB 91 Properly Draw the Line on “Violent Crime”?

A second potential concern may be how the penal code delineates
nonviolent offenses. The ACJC suggested that reducing the lower-level or
“nonviolent” offender prison population presented an opportunity for
the state to save costs while also reducing recidivism.297 It recommended,
and SB 91 implemented, expanded use of citations for nonviolent
misdemeanants298 and limited prison time for nonviolent offenders.299
But crime is not classified by violence or nonviolence. Instead, it is
classified by felonies, misdemeanors, and then infractions and violations.
Because of this classification system, the ACJC’s recommendations
regarding nonviolent crimes required the legislature to make its own
determinations on how to actually effect such a policy. In SB 91, it appears
that the legislature drew a cut-off point between class B and class C
felonies. That is, many of SB 91’s most substantial changes affect the class
C felony tier and below.300 These offenses have consequently seen
punishment relaxed by SB 91. For instance, they now carry a presumption
of probation for first-time offenses.301

295. AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 249, at 3.
296. Hopwood, supra note 294, at 454.
297. See JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 9 (discussing expert
consensus that lower-level offenders were not good candidates for incarceration).
298. See supra notes 117–20 and accompanying text.
299. See discussion supra Section II.B.
300. See supra notes 118–20, 199–202 and accompanying text (discussing key
changes built around class C felonies).
301. See supra notes 199–201 and accompanying text.
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This may create intuitive problems in practice when it comes to the
types of offenses that are now punished much less severely. Consider
some class C felonies: burglary in the second degree;302 an attempt to
commit,303 a solicitation of,304 or the criminal possession of explosives
with an intent to commit any class B felony;305 criminal mischief in the
third degree, which is the intentional damaging of another person’s
property at the felony threshold level;306 riot, which includes “tumultuous
and violent conduct;”307 misconduct involving weapons in the third
degree;308 vehicle theft in the first degree;309 and stalking in the first
degree, which requires conduct that places the victim or a family member
in fear of death or physical injury.310
These are disturbing offenses, which may now be treated similarly
to, or perhaps more leniently than, some “nonviolent” class A
misdemeanor offenses. In other words, by its blanket treatment of class C
felonies, SB 91 may have covered too broad a spectrum of offenses and
created some unwarranted lenience.311
Additionally, one legislator made the argument that SB 91 causes a
community condemnation issue.312 That is, these are crimes that any
reasonable citizen would know to be offensive to the public yet the
punishment imposed by the citizenry, through its laws, no longer reflects
as much.
Policymakers have already noticed problems with SB 91’s linedrawing, though. SB 54, if passed, would reinstate a presumption of up
to one year of prison time for a first class C felony conviction. This issue,
though, seems to have already caught the attention of the ACJC to some
degree, which has recommended restoring presumptive jail terms to class
C felonies. 313

302. ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.310 (2016).
303. Id. § 11.31.100(d)(4).
304. Id. § 11.31.110(c)(4).
305. Id. § 11.61.240(b)(3).
306. Id. § 11.46.482.
307. Id. § 11.61.100 (emphasis added).
308. Id. § 11.61.200.
309. Id. § 11.46.360.
310. Id. § 11.41.260.
311. See generally ALASKA H. JOURNAL, 29th Leg., 2d Sess. 2637–43 (May 2,
2016), and ALASKA H. JOURNAL, 29th Leg., 2d Sess. 2650–62 (May 3, 2016)
(recording amendments offered by Rep. Josephson, many of which involved
removing relaxed punishment for certain offenses).
312. See Reinbold, supra note 170 (arguing that relaxing criminal punishments
does not signal community condemnation of crime).
313. S.B. 54, 30th Leg., 1st Sess. § 6 (Alaska 2017).
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Nevertheless, this problem also highlighted a potential future reform
involving further subdivision of felony classifications. The legislature
could consider reviewing the plethora of class C felonies and separating
those offenses that are less serious, and do indeed warrant less severe
punishment, into a new felony class, or perhaps relegate them to
misdemeanors.
C.

The View from Other States

Other states’ experiences with JRI paints an unclear picture for
Alaska. According to JRI supporters, six of eighteen states that have
implemented JRI legislation long enough ago to allow for reasonable
observation have seen their prison populations shrink.314 Another nine
states had reported increases in their total prison populations, but at a
lower growth rate than would have occurred without reform, according
to Pew’s projections.315 A majority of states saw declines in their probation
populations.316 Supporters also report that JRI states had saved over a
billion dollars as of 2016, and reinvested approximately $450 million.317
Recidivism rates, furthermore, had been cut by as much as 30%.318 In sum,
their self-portrait is a rosy one, with benign “challenges” like improving
implementation through greater stakeholder support.319
Critics paint a different picture though. According to one review,
JRI’s claims of effectiveness are simply not true at worst, and based on
incomplete data and analysis at best.320 The study, conducted by some of
the originators of “justice reinvestment” as an idea, argued that there was
an inherent flaw in JRI’s method of basing claims of success on JRI’s own
hypothetical projections.321 Moreover, the study pointed out that 88% of
the decline in state prison populations across the country between 2008
and 2014 had come from just three states—California, New Jersey, and
New York—none of which had engaged the JRI.322 Ultimately, the study

314. See Harvell et al., supra note 75, at 176 (reporting that fifteen states had
prison populations below projections and that in nine of those states there was an
increase, meaning that six had seen a decrease).
315. Id.
316. Id. at 177.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 178. But see supra notes 258–63 and accompanying text (discussing
criticism of whether JRI is too elite-focused).
320. See AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 249, at 11–16 (analyzing data of JRI and nonJRI states).
321. Id. at 14 n.7.
322. James Austen et al., Reinvigorating Justice Reinvestment, 29 FED. SENT’G REP.
6, 9 (2016).
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concluded that there is no overall difference in the pattern of prison
populations between JRI and non-JRI states.323
By Pew’s menu of JRI policy options, Alaska was the most aggressive
JRI participant, adopting twenty-one of thirty-two types of JRI reforms.324
For perspective, the median was eight policy reforms, although it was
thirteen among the seventeen states that have enacted JRI legislation since
2012.325 Risk-needs assessment was one category where Alaska was in the
mainstream, joining twenty-one other states, as were graduated
responses to violations.326 On the other hand, when it came to sentencing,
Alaska (i) reclassified drug offenses, (ii) reclassified property offenses, (iii)
established a presumption of probation for certain offenses, (iv) revised
mandatory minimums, and (vi) revised sentencing guidelines.327 No
other JRI state implemented all six, or even five, of these reforms; only
four of thirty-three states implemented more than three.328
Mississippi is one of three states that shared fourteen reforms with
Alaska, making it the most similar purely in terms of that number.329
Between 2004 and 2014, Mississippi’s prison population grew 17% to over
22,600 inmates.330 The cost of doing nothing was projected to be $266
million.331 There is not a lot of reporting available on Mississippi since
then, but according to the BJA, Mississippi’s reforms have resulted in a
19% decline in the prison population relative to what had been
projected.332 Interestingly though, that decline had already begun a year
before Mississippi passed JRI legislation and continued at a similar rate
after enactment.333 The problems occurred while violent and property
crime rates in Mississippi increased by approximately 2% between 2013

323. Id. at 13; see also AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 249, at 11–16 (comparing JRI and
non-JRI states and concluding no significant progress).
324. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 1.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Mississippi HB 585: Recommendations of the Corrections and Criminal Justice
Task Force, RIGHT ON CRIME (Apr. 8, 2014) [hereinafter Mississippi HB 585],
http://rightoncrime.com/2014/04/mississippi-hb-585-recommendations-ofthe-corrections-and-criminal-justice-task-force/.
331. Id.
332. Mississippi, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, https://www.bja.gov/
programs/justicereinvestment/mississippi.html (last updated July 2015).
333. Id.
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and 2016.334 Accordingly, and especially given that it does not appear that
Mississippi’s rate of decarceration accelerated, it may be that JRI is not
responsible for improvement in Mississippi’s reduced prison population.
South Dakota is in some ways more similar to Alaska. For one,
whereas Mississippi had the second-highest total prison population in the
country prior to its JRI law,335 South Dakota is a more sparsely populated
state like Alaska,336 and so has a relatively small overall prison population
as well.337 Nevertheless, South Dakota’s prison population was at an alltime high prior to JRI and was projected to grow considerably, at a cost of
$224 million.338 Also like Alaska, the growth in South Dakota’s prison
population came as its crime rates were declining in the long-term,339
nonviolent offenders and parole revocations were identified as major
drivers of the increase.340 South Dakota was also similar to Alaska insofar
as its budget was a significant catalyst for JRI.341 South Dakota also took a
similar approach to Alaska by focusing on diversion for nonviolent, lowlevel offenders as well as strengthened supervision and intervention.342

334. Compare FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2016:
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS tbl.3 (2017), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/
crime-in-the-u.s/2016/tables/table-3 (showing Mississippi with a 280.1 violent
crime rate and a 2768.1 property crime rate), with FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2013: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS tbl.5 (2014),
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s-2013/tables/5table
datadecpdf/table_5_crime_in_the_united_states_by_state_2013.xls
(showing
Mississippi with a 274.6 violent crime rate and a 2724.1 property crime rate).
335. Mississippi HB 585, supra note 330.
336. See Resident Population Data (Text Version), UNITED STATES CENSUS 2010,
https://www.census.gov/2010census/data/apportionment-dens-text.php (last
visited Apr. 11, 2017) (ranking South Dakota forty-eighth in population density
and Alaska fifty-second).
337. Compare THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, SOUTH DAKOTA’S 2013 CRIMINAL
JUSTICE INITIATIVE 1 fig.1 (2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/
uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2013/PSPPSD2013CriminalJusticeInitiativepdf.pdf
(listing South Dakota as having 3636 inmates in 2012), with JUSTICE REINVESTMENT
REPORT, supra note 6, at 4 fig.1 (listing Alaska as having 5095 inmates in 2015).
338. BRIAN ELDERBROOM ET AL., URBAN INST., ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF SOUTH
DAKOTA’S SENTENCING REFORMS 1 (2016), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/
files/publication/80106/2000762-Assessing-the-Impact-of-South-Dakota%27sSentencing-Reforms-Justice-Reinvestment-Initiative.pdf.
339. Compare id. at 3, with PARKER, supra note 42, at 1 fig.1. (declining crime
rate), with JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 1 (increasing prison
population).
340. Compare THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 337, at 3–4, with JUSTICE
REINVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 2, 9 fig.3, 12.
341. Compare THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 337, at 4, with discussion
supra Section I.C.
342. See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 1 (showing policy reforms
implemented by South Dakota and Alaska).
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South Dakota’s JRI results, however, are discouraging. According to
the BJA, although South Dakota’s prison population had decreased 9%
compared to projections by 2015 (two years after implementation), the
prison population had declined on net by a mere thirty-five inmates—not
even a 1% decrease.343 Worse, according to South Dakota’s Department of
Corrections more recent updates, the prison population had increased by
approximately 8% between enactment and September 2017, putting it less
than 7% below projections.344 South Dakota was also crushed by a 30%
jump in its violent crime rate between 2012 and 2016,345 but this may be
part of a trend that spans much longer.346
In other words, South Dakota is illustrative of JRI critics’ point that
making claims of improvement based on (perhaps inflated) projections
may be misleading.347 South Dakota’s reforms have also caused
considerable tension within the state’s law enforcement and legal
community,348 and there has been some assertion that the problem is a
failure to focus on reducing drug crime.349 This result, combined with
343. South Dakota, BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, https://www.bja.gov/
programs/justicereinvestment/south_dakota.html (last updated June 2015).
344. Compare id., with S.D. DEP’T OF CORRS., SEPTEMBER 30, 2017 ADULT
CORRECTIONS (2017) (on file with author).
345. Compare FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2016:
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS tbl.3 (2017), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/
crime-in-the-u.s/2016/tables/table-3 (showing South Dakota with a 417.4 violet
crime rate), with FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2012:
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS tbl.5 (2013), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-theu.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s-2012/tables/5tabledatadecpdf/table_5_crime_in_the
_united_states_by_state_2013.xls (showing South Dakota with a 321.8 violent
crime rate).
346. See John Hult, Is South Dakota More Violent Than It’s Ever Been?, ARGUS
LEADER (Jan. 13, 2017), http://argusleader.com/story/news/crime/2017/01/
13/south-dakota-more-violent-than-s-ever-been/96456896/.
347. See supra note 321 and accompanying text.
348. See generally Angela Kennecke, Problems with Parole & Probation,
KELOLAND MEDIA GRP. (July 28, 2016, 10:00 PM), http://www. keloland.com/
news/article/investigates/problems-with-parole-probation (interviewing law
enforcement and corrections officials, as well as prosecutors and civilians, on
concerns about parole and probation); Jake Shama, Legal Battle: SB 70 Creating Rift
Between Officials, Judicial Process, THE DAILY REPUBLIC (Mar. 12, 2016, 10:18 AM),
http://www.mitchellrepublic.com/news/local/3985571-legal-battle-sb-70creating-rift-between-officials-judicial-process
(detailing law enforcement’s frustration with South Dakota’s JRI legislation).
349. See Kennecke, supra note 348 (quoting prosecutor complaining about
failure “to break the cycle of addiction”); cf. ELDERBLOOM ET AL., supra note 338, at
12 (concluding that South Dakota still has a problem with the way it criminalizes
drug ingestion). Pfaff suggests, in the alternative, that JRI in South Dakota was
essentially an incomplete effort insofar as it left prosecutors with too much
discretion that has been used to charge more low-level felony cases. PFAFF, supra
note 271, at 164; cf. TONRY, supra note 20, at 23–24 (describing need to reform
prosecutorial discretion).
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South Dakota’s reinvestment in criminal justice and law enforcement
agencies rather than services and treatment for offenders and victims,350
may also provide some validation to JRI critics’ concerns about not
fulfilling justice reinvestment’s original purpose.351
D.

The Risk in Risk Assessment

Pretrial risk assessment is to play a fundamental role in reducing
prison populations in Alaska’s new criminal justice regime.352 Yet SB 91,
though establishing a framework for how risk assessment will be
employed,353 offers little about what risk assessment might actually look
like.354 The legislative committees that reviewed SB 91 rarely cast more
than a fleeting look, at least on the record, at the development of a risk
assessment tool. And even then those exchanges hardly amounted to a
searching inquiry. A committee hearing inquiry from Senator Anna
MacKinnon to Nancy Meade, the general counsel of the Alaska Judicial
Council, may be the most probing:
MACKINNON: How and who will adopt a risk assessment tool?
Is it Corrections? Is it the courts? Who is going to adopt it? I
know that they are out there in other states now and being
successfully used as an objective tool; or at least I’ve been told.
It’s been asserted that there’s an objective tool out there that can
determine with a high rate of success—not 100% but a high rate
of success—whether a person is risky or not. So who is going to
adopt and choose the risk assessment?
MEADE: . . . That would be the Department of Corrections. . . .
The pretrial services program is the group within the
Department of Corrections that will be conducting the risk
assessment and adopting the tool. They will be doing that in
connection with the other affected criminal justice agencies. And
there are tools, that I understand it, that you can buy off-the350. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 337, at 6 tbl.1 (showing over onethird of initial $8 million in reinvestment going into training and implementation
and corrections infrastructure).
351. See AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 249, at 9–14 (arguing that JRI has become
overly formalized and focused on the number of prisoners and has so departed
from the original purpose of “justice reinvestment” to combat the causes of crime).
352. See supra notes 121–26 and accompanying text (discussing pretrial risk
assessment tool’s role in pretrial practice).
353. S.B. 91, 29th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 59 (Alaska 2016) (setting forth new rules
for pretrial release).
354. See id. § 117 (charging Commissioner of Department of Corrections with
approving risk assessment instrument).
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shelf, or that you can create yourself. In any case, the tool needs
to be . . . normalized to the local population so that it comes up
with the appropriate conclusion for our population.355
In an October 2017 report, the ACJC announced that it had selected
a risk assessment tool developed by the Crime and Justice Institute (CJI)
and that the CJI tool had been developed and validated for Alaska to
ensure equal treatment.356 Through the development process, the ACJC
had to make two adaptations to CJI’s tool to comply with SB 91
requirements. 357 First, SB 91 mandated that Alaska’s tool assess a
defendant as either low-risk, medium-risk, or high-risk, whereas CJI’s
original tool used five categories.358 Additionally, SB 91 required that
judges be provided a single score, whereas CJI’s original tool separated
risk of failure to appear from the risk of a new criminal offense.359
But the issues regarding actuarial instruments run far deeper than
the legislature seems to have considered. As Senator Coghill noted, there
are several issues with pretrial risk assessment.360 One is whether making
a pretrial release determination based upon an actuarial tool is
constitutional.361 Alaska’s Constitution guarantees the right to be released
on bail except for capital offenses.362 The Alaska Supreme Court, in dicta,
has qualified that while there is no absolute pretrial right to personal
recognizance release, there is a strong interest in pretrial freedom and so
release is favored.363 Thus, pretrial risk assessment by an actuarial tool
would seem to be constitutional so long as it was not eliminating the
preference for pretrial release, which, of course, is the opposite of what
the tool seeks insofar as it is an effort to facilitate more pretrial release. The
United States Supreme Court also recently denied a petition for certiorari
on the question of whether relying on a risk assessment too, without
providing the defendant discovery about how the tool makes its
355. Alaska S. Fin. Comm. Audio Tapes, 29th Leg. (Mar. 30, 2016) [hereinafter
Fin. Comm. Mar. 30] (discussion between Sen. Anne Mackinnon and Nancy
Meade at 2:46:45 PM).
356. ALASKA CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 17 (2017), www.
ajc.state.ak.us/sites/default/files/imported/acjc/alaska_criminal_justice_com
mission_annual_report_2017.pdf.
357. ALASKA CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM’N, MEETING MINUTES 1 (Aug. 23, 2017),
www.ajc.state.ak.us/sites/default/files/meeting-summaries/commission/
acjc8-23-17meetingsummary.pdf.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. ALASKA S. JUD. COMM. MINUTES, 29th Leg. (Mar. 11, 2016) (statement of
Sen. John Coghill at 3:30:31 PM).
361. Id.
362. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 11.
363. In re Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47, 51 (Alaska 1971) (citing Reeves v. State, 411
P.2d 212, 215–16 (Alaska 1966)).
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calculation, violates due process. 364 In 2016, a Wisconsin man who had
pled guilty and had a risk assessment included in his Presentence
Investigation Report hoped the Court would reverse the Wisconsin
Supreme Court’s decision that there was no due process violation when a
trial court relied on the risk assessment in sentencing without ever
disclosing to him how it computed his risk assessment.365 The federal
government was invited to file a brief as amicus curiae,366 and argued that
the lack of full transparency did not amount to a due process violation. 367
It also noted that the Indiana Supreme Court had reached a similar
conclusion.368 The Supreme Court denied the petition.369
Another concern is whether actuarial tools function fairly.
Supporters assert that Big Data more accurately predicts risk than
humans.370 Actuarial tools, then, are valuable given that some sort of risk
assessment is an unavoidable part of the criminal justice process.371
Opponents of the tools, while not necessarily conceding the point on
accuracy,372 rejoin that punishment ought to be about more than just
accuracy when an individual’s liberty is at stake.373 If the ideal sentencing
364. Shayna Posses, Justices Seek Solicitor General’s Take on Reoffense-Risk Tool,
LAW360 (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.law360.com/appellate/articles/
898446/justices-seek-solicitor-general-s-take-on-reoffense-risk-tool.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Loomis v. Wisconsin, No.
16-6387 (2016) at 12.
368. Id. at 21.
369. Michelle Liu, Supreme Court Refuses to Hear Wisconsin Predictive Crime
Assessment Case, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (June 26, 2017), http://www.
jsonline.com/story/news/crime/2017/06/26/supreme-court-refuses-hearwisconsin-predictive-crime-assessment-case/428240001/.
370. See Anna Maria Barry-Jester et al., Should Prison Sentences Be Based on
Crimes That Haven’t Been Committed Yet?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 4, 2015),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/prison-reform-risk-assessment/; see also
Michael A. Wolff, Evidence-Based Judicial Discretion: Promoting Public Safety
Through State Sentencing Reform, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1389, 1406 n.73 (listing sources
that detail actuarial predictions’ superior accuracy to human judgment).
371. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. a, at 53, 55 (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2011) (“[J]udges . . . make daily judgments about . . . the risks of
recidivism posed by offenders. These judgments, pervasive as they are, are
notoriously imperfect.”); see also Sonja B. Starr, Sentencing, by the Numbers, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 10, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/11/opinion/
sentencing-by-the-numbers.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=2 (conceding that judges
always make judgments about future risk informally).
372. See Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization
of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 842–62 (2014) (questioning accuracy of
actuarial tools).
373. See Starr, supra note 371 (“[I]t’s worth considering whether actuarial
methods can help make . . . predictions more accurate. The problem isn’t risk
assessment per se; it’s basing scores on demographic and socioeconomics.”); Anna
Maria Barry-Jester, supra note 370 (“But to critics, just because a trait predicts
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system would base punishment on the individual and the charged
conduct, then there is something deeply unfair about determining an
individual’s punishment based on group averages.374 Opponents add that
risk assessment tools are racially biased and will only exacerbate racial
injustice in America’s mass incarceration problem.375 ProPublica studied
one risk assessment tool used in Florida, called COMPAS, and found that
it falsely flagged black defendants as high-risk twice as frequently as it
did white defendants. 376 COMPAS also misjudged white defendants to
be low-risk more frequently than it did black defendants.377
Alaskan legislators do not seem to have discussed COMPAS,378 but
they did explicitly mention Kentucky’s tool in hearings, 379 long before the
CJI tool was selected. Kentucky’s validated tool, developed by the Arnold
Foundation,380 weighs twelve questions considering the defendant’s
residency, means of support, charge and prior criminal history, as well as
history of drug or alcohol abuse.381 The tool has generally been considered
to be successful, with Kentucky authorities reporting that personal
recognizance and unsecured bond release have increased without
diminishing appearance or public safety rates.382 One can imagine,
crime doesn’t mean it’s fair to use . . . .”).
374. See, e.g., Att’y Gen. Eric Holder, Remarks at Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal
Defense Lawyers 57th Annual Meeting (Aug. 1, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-speaks-national-association-criminaldefense-lawyers-57th (discussing values of data in justice, but expressing deep
concern about implications for individualized and equal justice); Starr, supra note
371 (calling current use of risk assessment tools “deeply unfair”).
375. See generally Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-incriminal-sentencing (studying use of COMPAS risk assessment tool in one county
and finding bias against African-Americans). See also Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as
a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of Risk Assessment, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 237, 237 (2015)
(arguing against use of all risk assessment because advantages outweighed by
cost to racial justice).
376. Angwin et al., supra note 375.
377. Id.
378. But see Nathaniel Herz, As Alaska Prepares to Use a Crime Prediction Tool,
Racial Bias is Found in One, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (June 27, 2016), https://www.
adn.com/alaska-news/crime-justice/2016/05/24/as-alaska-prepares-to-use-acrime-prediction-tool-racial-bias-is-found-in-one/ (quoting Sen. Coghill as
neither confirming nor denying interest in COMPAS, but stating that Alaska’s
system will be subject to tight scrutiny and review, as required by SB 91).
379. ALASKA S. JUD. COMM. MINUTES, 29th Leg. (Mar. 11, 2016) (statement of
Jordan Schilling, Staff, Sen. John Coghill at 2:23:41 PM).
380. Anna Maria Barry-Jester et al., supra note 370.
381. JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., KENTUCKY PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT
VALIDATION tbl.11 (2010), http://www.pretrial.org/download/risk-assessment/
2010%20KY%20Risk%20Assessment%20Study%20JFA.pdf.
382. See PRETRIAL SERVS., ADMIN. OFF. OF THE CTS. KY. CT. OF JUST., PRETRIAL
REFORM IN KENTUCKY 16–17 (showing increase in pretrial release, appearance rate,
and public safety rate before and after validation of risk assessment tool).
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however, how factors like residency, substance abuse history, and means
of support, even if not explicitly biased, may cause some individual
offenders to be prejudiced. It is unclear what factors the CJI tool uses in
its calculation.
Proponents of risk assessment tools have vigorously disputed the
charges of racial bias,383 and have added that even if risk assessments
were identified as biased, pernicious factors can be omitted.384 But
opponents respond that this belies the entire purpose of the tool; if the
benefit of the tool is accuracy, then the proponents’ logic would require
the use of race-related factors because they tend to correlate with
accuracy.385 Not to consider race, then, would undermine the principal
benefits of risk assessment tools: their objectivity and accuracy.386
Proponents respond by pointing to the safeguard of judicial discretion,387
as is provided for in SB 91.388 Ultimately, they might contend, judges can
and will correct unfairness. However, in addition to that not being borne
out by years of judges making their own risk assessments in a manner
that has often been racially prejudicial,389 opponents of the tools contend
that advocates ought to be careful what they wish for.
In sum, the issue is extraordinarily fraught. SB 91 requires that the
risk assessment tool be validated,390 and, according to the ACJC’s 2017
Annual Report, it has been.391 Stakeholders should continue to scrutinize
383. ANTHONY W. FLORES ET AL., FALSE POSITIVES, FALSE NEGATIVES, AND FALSE
ANALYSES: A REJOINDER TO “MACHINE BIAS: THERE’S SOFTWARE ACROSS THE
COUNTRY TO PREDICT FUTURE CRIMINALS. AND IT’S BIASED AGAINST BLACKS.” 19
(July 11, 2016), http://www.crj.org/assets/2017/07/9_Machine_bias_ rejoinder.
pdf; JENNIFER L. SKEEM & CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP, RISK, RACE, & RECIDIVISM:
PREDICTIVE BIAS & DISPARATE IMPACT 29, 36–37 (June 14, 2016), https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2687339.
384. See SKEEM & LOWENKAMP, supra note 383, at 6 (noting studies showing
“how to remove ‘invidious predictors’”).
385. See Joan Petersilia & Susan Turner, Guideline-Based Justice: Prediction and
Racial Minorities, 9 CRIME & JUST. 151, 173–74 (1987).
386. See J.C. Olesen, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and
Evidence-Based Sentencing, 64 SMU L. REV. 1329, 1356–58 (2011) (noting strong
correlation between race and recidivism and that, although there are sound
reasons for exclusion, it may make predictors less accurate).
387. See JOINT TECH. COMM., JTC RESOURCE BULLETIN: USING TECHNOLOGY TO
IMPROVE PRETRIAL RELEASE DECISION-MAKING 13 (2016), https://university.
pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFile
Key=91b29133-7689-ca6f-0147-b0720ec901e1&forceDialog=0.
388. See S.B. 91, 29th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 59 (Alaska 2016) (granting judges
discretion to not allow release for certain defendants if clear and convincing
evidence of risk to community for not appearing).
389. See generally Cynthia E. Jones, “Give Us Free”: Addressing Racial Disparities
in Bail Determinations, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 919 (2013) (overviewing
racial disparities in bail determinations and pretrial decisions).
390. S.B. 91, 29th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 117 (Alaska 2016).
391. ALASKA CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM’N, supra note 356, at 18.
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the tool carefully to ensure that the CJI tool reliably does more good than
harm once implemented in January of 2018.
E.

Alaska Natives and Reinvestment

The ACJC’s Justice Reinvestment Report never mentions the impact
that criminal justice reform will have on Alaska Natives.392 Although
Alaska Natives make up just one-sixth of Alaska’s population, they make
up over one-third of the state’s prison population.393 In 2015, Alaska
Natives constituted nearly 40% of all inmates convicted of alcohol and
personal offenses, one-third of those convicted of property and public
order offenses, and 44% of those convicted of registerable sex offenses.394
Among the state’s 1792 Alaska Native inmates in 2016, almost one-third
were property offenders and one-fifth were sex offenders.395 A 2013 study
found that almost half of the state’s rape victims were Alaska Natives,
and that Alaska Natives suffer domestic violence at immensely higher
rates than other groups in both the state and the country.396 Alaska
Natives also far outpaced other demographic groups in Alaska when it
came to the offender population’s criminal history as of 2013, with 29% of
Alaska Natives having no prior felonies but four or more
misdemeanors.397 A study conducted in 2006 found that alcohol abuse
was a contributing factor in 97% of all crimes committed by Alaska
Natives.398
These are devastating statistics. Alaska Natives are precisely the type
of community, so harmed by crime, that the originators of justice
reinvestment were concerned about. Successful reform in Alaska’s
growing prison population, the data plainly indicates, requires some
specific attention to address the needs and challenges of Alaska Natives.
Compounding those challenges, rural Alaskan villages are
disadvantaged by a lack of resources for public safety, for victims, and for
substance abusers.399 Relatedly, as of 2015, Alaska Natives were placed on
392. See generally JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 6.
393. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 41, at 15.
394. DIV. OF ADMIN. SERV., 2015 OFFENDER PROFILE 17–18, ALASKA DEP’T OF
CORRECTIONS (2016) [hereinafter 2015 OFFENDER PROFILE], http://www.correct
.state.ak.us/admin/docs/2015profile.pdf.
395. Id.
396. INDIAN LAW. & ORDER. COMM’N, A ROADMAP FOR MAKING NATIVE AMERICA
SAFER: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT & CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 41 (2013),
http://www.aisc.ucla.edu/iloc/report/files/A_Roadmap_For_Making_Native
_America_Safer-Full.pdf.
397. ALASKA FELONY SENTENCING PATTERNS, supra note 23, at 33 tbl.11.
398. Ryan Fortson, Advancing Tribal Court Jurisdiction in Alaska, 32 ALASKA L.
REV. 93, 98 (2015).
399. INDIAN LAW. & ORDER. COMM’N, supra note 396, at 41 (noting lack of police
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electronic monitoring at a rate of 25%, only slightly higher than AfricanAmericans who more often live in urban areas closer to courts and jails,
despite far more Alaska Natives being involved in the criminal justice
system.400 That means that because of their remoteness, large numbers of
Alaska Natives are brought hundreds of miles from their families and
communities to await trial, a problem other demographic groups confront
less frequently.
Alaska Native groups, such as the Alaska Federation of Natives,401
the Tanana Chiefs Conference,402 the Bristol Bay Native Corporation,403
and the Central Council of Tlingit & Haida Indian Tribes of Alaska,404
have expressed support for SB 91. They conveyed optimism about, among
other provisions, reductions in pre-trial incarceration,405 graduated
sanctions for VCOR,406 relaxing of driver’s license restrictions,407 and
suspended entry of judgment.408 Uniformly, Alaska Native groups were
also supportive of reinvestment opportunities.409
Perhaps reinvestment is SB 91’s answer to better justice for Alaska
Natives. While some elements of SB 91 may continue to disadvantage
Alaska Natives,410 if SB 91 is to reduce the deluge of Alaska Natives into
officers, shelters for women who are victims of domestic violence, and substance
abuse treatment facilities in rural Alaska).
400. 2015 OFFENDER PROFILE, supra note 394, at 23.
401. Julie Kitka, Criminal Justice Reform is Right on the Money for Rural Alaska,
ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (June 26, 2016), https://www.adn.com/commentary/
article/criminal-justice-reform-right-money-rural-alaska/2016/04/04/.
402. Letter from Victor Joseph, President & CEO, Tanana Chiefs Conference,
to S. State Affairs Comm. Members (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.akleg.gov/
basis/get_documents.asp?session=29&docid=63793.
403. Letter from Jason Metrokin, President & CEO, Bristol Bay Native Corp.,
to Reps. Mark Neuman & Steve Thompson (Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.akleg.
gov/basis/get_documents.asp?session=29&docid=66455.
404. ALASKA S. STATE AFFAIRS. COMM. MINUTES, 29th Leg. (Mar. 8, 2016)
[hereinafter Singh Statement] (statement of Natasha Singh, Gen. Counsel, Cent.
Council of Tlingit & Haida Indian Tribes of Alaska at 9:49:35 AM).
405. E.g., Kitka, supra note 401.
406. E.g., id.
407. E.g., Letter from Julie Kitka, President, The Alaska Fed’n of Natives, to S.
President Kevin Meyer & H. Speaker Mike Chenault (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.
akleg.gov/basis/get_documents.asp?session=29&docid=63793.
408. Letter from Victor Joseph to S. State Affairs Comm. Members, supra note
402.
409. Kitka, supra note 401; see Letter from Victor Joseph to S. State Affairs
Comm. Members, supra note 402; Letter from Jason Metrokin to Mark Neuman &
Steve Thompson, supra note 403; Singh Statement, supra note 404.
410. For example, according to Senator Coghill, who was also an ACJC
commissioner, the ACJC recommended a $2000 felony theft threshold—which the
Legislature had previously lowered to $1000—in part to account for the fact that
property valuations are so much greater in the Alaskan bush compared to urban
and suburban Alaska. ALASKA H. FIN. COMM. MINUTES, 29th Leg. (Apr. 27, 2016)
(statement of Sen. John Coghill at 5:43:10 PM). For instance, stealing the same
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state prisons, reform will have to meaningfully attack the resource
shortage, substance abuse, and victimization issues that disparately
impact Alaska Natives and others who live in rural Alaska. However,
given the experiences of other states, where reinvestment has often
returned to the criminal justice system rather than the types of services
that help individuals overcome criminal tendencies,411 critics of JRI are
not so optimistic that meaningful reinvestment will happen.412 This was,
after all, Cadora and Turner’s primary critique of the way justice
reinvestment has been implemented.413
A lack of prepared reinvestment was part of the problem in South
Dakota.414 It also may be borne out in Alaska too. SB 91 makes no
reinvestment commitments, but rather leaves it to the ACJC to make
annual recommendations.415 According to Pew’s review of SB 91 fiscal
notes, over half of Alaska’s $98 million in projected reinvestment between
2016 and 2022 will go to “pretrial services and supervision.”416 Another
$7 million will go to implementation, while $11 million will be left for
victims’ services and violence prevention, and $15.5 million will be
directed to “community-based behavioral health and re-entry
services.”417 Finally, $11 million will go to treatment in prisons.418 In 2018,
$17 million of the $25 million reinvested will go to administrative costs.419
Just one-tenth of that, a mere $1.7 million, will go to substance abuse
snow machine could be a misdemeanor in Anchorage but a felony in Anvik
simply because the snow machine is more valuable in the bush. Additionally, it
never seemed to be clear, even to legislators, how the benefits of avoiding thirdparty custodians through electronic monitoring will actually accrue to villagers.
See ALASKA H. FIN. COMM. MINUTES, 29th Leg. (Apr. 20, 2016) (statements of Rep.
Les Gara and Dean Williams, Comm’r, Dep’t of Corrections at 2:21:47 PM)
(expressing concern that rural Alaskans will not benefit from expanded electronic
monitoring).
411. See, e.g., PFAFF, supra note 271, at 165, 226–27 (overviewing reinvestment
problems in JRI programs).
412. AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 249, at 9–14 (questioning whether JRI serves
justice reinvestment’s original purpose of delivering crime-reducing spending to
high incarceration communities).
413. See supra notes 253–57 (comparing original intention of justice
reinvestment to reinvest in communities weakened by crime with systemoriented way that reinvestment has taken place).
414. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 337, at 6 tbl.1 (showing over onethird of initial $8 million in reinvestment going into training and implementation
and corrections infrastructure).
415. S.B. 91, 29th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. §§ 163, 165 (Alaska 2016).
416. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 41, at 20 tbl.5.
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Devin Kelly et al., How SB 91 Has Changed Alaska’s Criminal Justice System,
ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.adn.com/alaskanews/crime-courts-2017/10/21/how-sb-91-has-changed-alaskas-criminaljustice-system/.
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treatment in prisons.420 Less than $4 million would go out-of-prison
treatment and prevention programs.421 And of the $3 million allocated for
re-entry, over half of that was appropriated to Medicaid claims.422
In the lead-up to the 2017 special legislative session, it was been
frequently lamented that reinvestment did not occur early enough in SB
91’s implementation.423 ACJC commissioners similarly indicated at their
August 2017 meeting that “there has been no strategic plan for deploying
reinvestment money,” “a lot of time [had been spent] talking about
mechanics of reform, but not the details of reinvestment,” and that there
had been struggles “with a lack of infrastructure for reentry work.”424 The
ACJC’s 2017 annual report “strongly recommend[ed] further
reinvestment in treatment for substance abuse and mental health issues
going forward.”425 The report also provided several “principles” for
reinvestment. Most of these—aimed toward evidenced-based and datadriven practices, as well as tangible monetary returns—are deeply
intertwined with the JRI model.426 Principles six and seven offer promise
by urging targeting across the state and funding for prevention
programming.427
For SB 91 to be what it was promised—a scheme that will save the
state money by shrinking the prison population, and keep the public safer
by using that money to slow the conveyor belt of individuals into the
criminal justice system—reinvestment must play a significant role. For
example, reinvestment could be directed toward meeting the ACJC’s
preferred recommendation of making ASAP available to more

420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Victoria Taylor, Anchorage Assembly Drafts Resolution Addressing Some
Public Safety Concerns, KTOO (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.ktoo.org/2017/10/
04/anger-crime-boils-lawmakers-weigh-changes-law/ (quoting Anchorage
Assemblyman Eric Croft as complaining that although SB 91 savings were
upfront, their reinvestment was back-loaded or never funded treatment and
probation); Lori Townsend, The Mayor of Anchorage Addresses Concern over Crime
and Safety, ALASKA PUB. MEDIA (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.alaskapublic.org/
2017/09/22/the-mayor-of-anchorage-addresses-concern-over-crime-and-safety/
(quoting Anchorage Mayor Ethan Berkowitz as saying “Senate Bill 91 was
intended to replace incarceration with rehabilitation. . . . But they didn’t back-fill
at the same time with putting the rehabilitation resources in place. So in a little
bit, we’ve not even seen [SB 91] the way it was created.”).
424. See ALASKA CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM’N, MEETING MINUTES 9 (Aug. 23,
2017), www.ajc.state.ak.us/sites/default/files/meeting-summaries/
commission/acjc8-23-17meetingsummary.pdf
(quoting
ACJC
Chairman
Stephanie Rhoades, Chairman Razo and Commissioner Stanfill, respectively).
425. ALASKA CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM’N, supra note 356, at ix.
426. Id. at 56–59.
427. Id. at 59.
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individuals through increased funding.428 The importance of
reinvestment is accentuated by the interplay between crime and Alaska’s
severe opioid crisis, which causes crime.429
Accordingly, stakeholders, Alaska Native stakeholders particularly,
should be careful to ensure that SB 91’s savings support measures that
will reduce crime and help both offenders and victims in communities,
both rural and urban, that need the assistance the most.

CONCLUSION
This Note examined SB 91, Alaska’s version of justice reinvestment,
and addressed some of the potential concerns that may lie ahead for the
state to facilitate discussion and evaluation of SB 91. There are other issues
to be sure. This Note did not discuss, for example, whether reduced
sentences will affect plea bargaining and trial rates, whether more lenient
punishment will disincentivize time-intensive diversion to therapeutic
courts, whether SB 91 provides sufficient regard for constitutionallyprotected victims’ rights, and how certain changes might alter the
conduct of police and prosecutors.
The uncertainty that lies ahead for SB 91 is captured by what has
taken place in other states, and even by events in Alaska in the year since
the law’s enactment. Not half a year after Governor Walker signed SB 91,
the ACJC provided fourteen new recommendations, neither unanimously
approved nor based on empirical evidence, that advocated rolling back
some of SB 91’s changes.430 The new recommendations were offered in
response to criticism from the public,431 law enforcement,432 and
428. See supra notes 229–30 and accompanying text.
429. See id. at 47; see also Press Release, Jahna Lindemuth & Walt Monegan,
Commentary: SB 54 (Oct. 3, 2017), http://www.law.state.ak.us/press/releases/
2017/100317-SB54.html (regarding opioid epidemic as a foremost issue
contributing to Alaska’s public safety problem); Townsend, supra note 423
(reporting concerns from Anchorage Mayor Ethan Berkowitz about opioid
epidemic’s impact on increased crime rates); Travis Khachatoorian, After Increase
in Crime, Anchorage Business Owners Advocate for Changes to SB 91, KTUU (Sept. 20,
2017), http://www.ktuu.com/content/news/Business-owners-meet-withcriminal-justice—446330263.html (quoting Anchorage District Attorney Clint
Campion’s caution that opioid crisis needs to be taken into account in increased
crime rates).
430. See RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE LEGISLATURE, supra note 15, at 1–2.
431. See id. at 1, 6 (noting public concern); see also Liz Kellar, supra note 277
(quoting Sen. Coghill as saying, “Public condemnation has played a huge part in
this. We cannot ignore the public, who feel [sic] so violated.”).
432. See RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE LEGISLATURE, supra note 15, at 1, 3, 5 (noting
law enforcement concerns); see also Kellar, supra note 277 (noting some SB 91
changes were unpopular with law enforcement). Additionally, the representative
of law enforcement on the ACJC, Juneau Police Department Lieutenant Kris Sell,
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prosecutors.433 Among other objectives, the recommendations proposed
returning VCOR to misdemeanor status434 and reinstating jail time for
class C felonies435 and property theft below $250.436 In April 2017, SB 54,
which more or less embodies these changes, had passed the Senate by a
nineteen-to-one vote.437 In some regards, though, the Senate version of SB
54 goes even further than the ACJC’s new recommendations. For
example, while the ACJC advised restoring a zero- to ninety-day active
prison presumption for class C felonies,438 SB 54 rolls the presumption
back to range from zero days to one year.439 SB 54 also adds a five-day
suspended sentence for property theft less than $250 (fourth degree
property theft), a five-day active sentence for the second conviction, and
ten days for every conviction thereafter.440 The ACJC’s new
recommendations had only suggested that a third offense be punishable
by up to ten days in jail.441 SB 54’s third main change is to return a
violation of conditions of release to a misdemeanor, thereby making it
punishable by prison time.442
SB 54 has also fractured the broad coalition of stakeholders that
helped usher in SB 91.443 This retrenchment is a reminder of just how

resigned from the ACJC, allegedly due to pushback from the law enforcement
community. Liz Kellar, With Clashing Views on SB 91, JPD Lt. Kris Sell Resigns from
Criminal Justice Commission, JUNEAU EMPIRE (Feb. 16, 2017), http://juneauempire.
com/local/2017-02-16/clashing-views-sb-91-jpd-lt-kris-sell-resigns-criminaljustice-commission. Sell had been a charismatic advocate of the ACJC’s
recommendations. See, e.g., ALASKA H. FIN. COMM. MINUTES, 29th Leg. (Apr. 19,
2016) (statement of Lt. Kris Sell at 2:03:21 PM) (testifying as to difficult personal
“journey” on criminal justice reform and consequent unpopularity from law
enforcement colleagues).
433. See RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE LEGISLATURE, supra note 15, at 1, 3, 5, 6
(noting prosecutor concerns).
434. Id. at 2.
435. Id. at 5.
436. Id. at 2–3.
437. ALASKA S. JOURNAL, 30th Leg., 1st Sess. 839 (Apr. 7, 2017).
438. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE LEGISLATURE, supra note 15, at 5.
439. S.B. 54, 30th Leg., 1st Sess. § 6 (Alaska 2017).
440. Id. § 10.
441. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE LEGISLATURE, supra note 15, at 3.
442. Id. § 2.
443. See Letter from the Bd. of Dirs. of the Alaska Ass’n of Chiefs of Police, to
Sen. Anna MacKinnon (Mar. 27, 2017), http://www.akleg.gov/basis/get_
documents.asp?session=30&docid=15055 (conveying law enforcement’s support
of SB 54 to rollback SB 91); see also supra note 280–281 (discussing Senator
Costello’s support of a bill to repeal SB 91, although she was formerly a co-sponsor
of SB 91). But see Letter from Tara A. Rich, to Sens. Lyman Hoffman & Anna
MacKinnon, (Mar. 27, 2017), http://www.akleg.gov/basis/get_documents.asp?
session=30&docid=15054 (conveying ACLU of Alaska’s opposition to SB 54 and
support for allowing SB 91 reforms to mature).
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politically fraught criminal justice reform can be, and how evaluation of
legislated criminal justice reform must be mindful of political realities.444
Part of what this Note has aimed to point out is that some of the
rollbacks to SB 91 might be prudent on their own merits. The absence of
a potential for prison time for a first-time class C felony, for instance, was
problematic.445 The reduction of sanctions for petty theft likewise did
significant damage to any deterrence function that criminal sanction
might play for those offenses.446
But it would be rash to lose faith in SB 91 because of the 2016 crime
data’s upward trend.447 Professor Brad A. Myrstol of the University of
Alaska Anchorage Justice Center has cautioned that there is not enough
data to support a conclusion that SB 91 caused the reported increase in
crime.448 Professor Myrstol and Pamela Cravez have wisely cautioned
that community variance would seem to belie the arguments that a
statewide change (i.e., SB 91) was the primary cause of changes in crime
rates.449 They also contend that SB 91 is really about recidivism reduction,
meaning that it is imperative to wait until there is more data on whether
offenders are repeating more or less frequently.450 But, most importantly
perhaps, they note that crime has been trending upward for the past
several years, not just in 2016.451
The 2016 crime report data, itself, also challenges the hypothesis that
SB 91 has led to more crime. For instance, consider the critique that the
reduced sanctions for fourth degree theft were letting petty thieves steal
with impunity.452 If so, we might expect to see more shoplifting, but
shoplifting actually went down by 6% between 2015 and 2016.453

444. See supra discussion Part III.A.
445. See supra notes 199–202 and accompanying text.
446. See supra notes 169–72 and accompanying text.
447. See Herz, supra note 42.
448. Hillman, supra note 276 (audio recording with Myrstol discussing trouble
with pinning increase in crime to SB 91); see also Myrstol & Cravez, supra note 276,
at 2.
449. Myrstol & Cravez, supra note 276, at 2; see also Hillman, supra note 276
(audio recording with host and Myrstol comparing crime trends in various parts
of the state).
450. Myrstol & Cravez, supra note 276, at 2.
451. Id. at 1–2 (presenting four figures showing increases in crime in recent
years); see also Herz, supra note 42 (showing increased incidences of crime in seven
categories of offenses since 2012).
452. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
453. Compare CHRISTEN L. SPEARS, ALASKA DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, CRIME IN
ALASKA 2016: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT 29 (2017),
dps.alaska.gov/DPSPublicSite/media/Statewide/Documents/UCR/CIAK2016for-publication-REV-09-06-17.pdf (3383 shoplifting offenses in 2016), with
CHRISTEN L. MCCLURE, ALASKA DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, CRIME IN ALASKA 2015:
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT 29 (2016), dps.alaska.gov/
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Additionally, the average value stolen in reported larceny offenses, which
does not involve force and therefore most likely captures the changes in
SB 91 that worried critics, went up by $40.454 This might further cast doubt
on SB 91’s causal role in Alaskan crime in 2016 insofar as we would expect
to see more low-level thefts, and therefore a decrease in the average value
stolen, if SB 91 was emboldening petty criminals. However, the increase
could also be from small thefts going unreported more frequently. In
short, while it is tempting to blame SB 91 for increased crime in Alaska in
2016, the data is not clear.
Moreover, SB 91 has not even been fully implemented. Important
components, like risk assessments, have not yet gone into effect.455 Rolling
back SB 91 now, at the cost of millions of dollars,456 for what was always
going to be a long-term project on such a limited data set would be
imprudent.
Ultimately, for a number of reasons—whether race, economics,
scholarship, politics, or public safety—criminal justice has returned as a
salient issue in the American consciousness.457 What this Note illustrates
is that issue salience is one thing, but issue framing is another.458 Alaska
has chosen a particular frame, fixed largely, although not exclusively,
around fiscal responsibility. SB 91’s goals have thus been cast as saving
money that can then be reinvested into the criminal justice system in ways

DPSPublicSite/media/Statewide/Documents/UCR/2015-CIAK-Revised-02-082017.pdf (3601 shoplifting offenses in 2015).
454. CHRISTEN L. SPEARS, ALASKA DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, CRIME IN ALASKA 2016:
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT 28 (2017), dps.alaska.gov/
DPSPublicSite/media/Statewide/Documents/UCR/CIAK2016-for-publicationREV-09-06-17.pdf.
455. Brad A. Myrstol & Pamela Cravez, Crime Rates and Alaska Criminal Justice
Reform, ALASKA JUST. F. (last visited Oct. 21, 2017), https://www.uaa.alaska.edu/
academics/college-of-health/departments/justice-center/alaska-justiceforum/34/2fall2017/a.crime-rates-and-reform.cshtml; see also Letter from Tara A.
Rich to Sens. Lyman Hoffman & Anna MacKinnon, supra note 443 (arguing that it
is too soon to undo SB 91 before key parts of the process, particularly
reinvestment, are implemented).
456. James Brooks, Rolling Back Criminal Justice Reform Would Cost Alaska
Millions, JUNEAU EMPIRE (Mar. 30, 2017), http://juneauempire.com/state/2017-03
-29/rolling-back-criminal-justice-reform-would-cost-alaska-millions.
457. See, e.g., Steven M. Teles, Why Criminal Justice Reform Still Needs the Right,
CATO UNBOUND (Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.cato-unbound.org/2016/11/07/
steven-m-teles/why-criminal-justice-reform-still-needs-right (discussing change
in issue salience of criminal justice reform).
458. See Kevin M. Drakulich & Eileen M. Kirk, Public Opinion and Criminal
Justice Reform, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 171, 173–75 (2016) (discussing
importance of framing in criminal justice reform).
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that otherwise would be unavailable given the state’s budget shortfalls.459
SB 91’s trade-offs have likewise been largely focused on making the policy
choices that will do the most to reduce prison populations and corrections
costs. When Pew, the ACJC, and the legislature evaluate SB 91’s success,
they will likely look at three metrics: the prison population, the
corrections budget, and recidivism rates. In sum, the choice of framing
around cost has had impacts at the front-end (goal setting), the middle
(policymaking), and the back-end (evaluation) of the SB 91 process. There
is undoubtedly sound reasoning behind SB 91’s framing and SB 91’s
policies.460 No one can fault Senator Coghill’s urging that SB 91, or
something like it, was necessary.461 But whether that framing can create
wholesale and long-term improvement to the health of Alaska’s criminal
justice system may depend on recognizing its limitations.

459. See, e.g., ALASKA S. FIN. COMM. MINUTES, 29th Leg. (Mar. 29, 2016)
(statement of Jordan Schilling, Staff, Sen. John Coghill at 9:16:38 AM)
(emphasizing halting spending on practices that are not working and reinvesting
in those that data has shown will).
460. See PFAFF, supra note 271, at 186 (acknowledging prudence of making
reforms that may only reach “low-hanging fruit”); see AUSTIN ET AL., supra note
249, at 1 (“JRI has played a major role in educating state legislators and public
officials about the bloated and expensive correctional system, persuading them to
undertake reforms not previously on the table. Considering the country’s fourdecade addiction to mass incarceration and harsh punishment, the general refusal
to acknowledge its failures and the monumental resistance to change, JRI’s most
enduring contribution to date may be its having created a space and a mindset
among state officials to seriously entertain the possibility of lowering prison
populations.”).
461. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.

